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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY JEAN GALBRAITH*
In this section:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

President Trump “Unsigns” Arms Trade Treaty After Requesting Its Return from the
Senate
Senate Gives Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of Four Bilateral Tax Treaties
United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade
Organization, Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process
United States Resists Efforts to Have the Arctic Council Make Climate-Related
Statement
Trump Administration Takes Domestic and International Measures to Restrict Asylum
Secretary of State Establishes Commission on Unalienable Rights
Trump Administration’s Iran Policies Raise Questions About the Executive’s Authority
to Use Force Against Iran
U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Habeas Case Brought by Guantánamo Bay
Detainee Challenging His Continuing Detention

* Karlos Bledsoe, Kristen DeWilde, Emily Friedman, Emily Kyle, Beatrix Lu, Jamie Nash, Bala Thenappan,
Rebecca Wallace, and Howard Weiss contributed to the preparation of this section.
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
President Trump “Unsigns” Arms Trade Treaty After Requesting Its Return from the Senate
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.57

In a speech before the National Riﬂe Association (NRA) on April 26, 2019, President
Trump announced that he was requesting the return of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
from the Senate and that the United States would unsign this treaty.1 Shortly thereafter,
Trump issued a formal letter to the Senate requesting the ATT’s return.2 As of late
September, the Senate had not formally approved Trump’s request.3 Nonetheless, on July
18, 2019, the Trump administration communicated to the secretary-general of the United
Nations that the United States does not intend to become a party to the ATT and thus has no
future legal obligations stemming from signature.4
The ATT seeks to “[e]stablish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms” and to
“[p]revent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion.”5
In particular, the ATT requires each state party to establish and maintain a national control system to regulate and document the international export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and
brokering of conventional arms.6 The national control system documentation as well as a report
of the national laws and regulations enacted to implement the provisions of the treaty are to be
made available to the other state parties.7 Additionally, each state party must consider whether a
transfer of conventional arms “would contribute to or undermine peace and security” in the
international community, and the state is entirely prohibited from engaging in a transfer if
the state knows that the transferred arms would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes.8 Presently, 104 nations are party to the ATT.9
1
Remarks at the National Riﬂe Association Institute for Legislative Action Leadership Forum in Indianapolis,
Indiana, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 243, at 6 (Apr. 26) [hereinafter Trump Announcement].
2
Donald J. Trump, Message to the Senate on the Withdrawal of the Arms Trade Treaty, 2019 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. NO. 249 (Apr. 29) [hereinafter ATT Return Request].
3
See S. Res. 204 – An Executive Resolution to Return to the President of the United States the Arms Trade
Treaty, at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-resolution/204 [https://perma.cc/8KY7-J4QY]
[hereinafter S. Res. 204] (showing that a resolution to return the ATT was introduced to the Senate on May
13, 2019, but has not yet been approved).
4
See Depositary Notiﬁcation from the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. C.N.314.2019.TREATIES-XXVI.8
(July 19, 2019) [hereinafter Unsigning Letter].
5
Arms Trade Treaty, Art. 1, C.N.266.2013.TREATIES-XXVI.8 (Apr. 2, 2013), available at https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7T83KGMU] [hereinafter ATT].
6
Id. Arts. 2(2), 5(2)–(5). The ATT deﬁnes conventional arms as including the following categories: “(a) Battle
tanks; (b) Armored combat vehicles; (c) Large-caliber artillery systems; (d) Combat aircraft; (e) Attack helicopters;
(f) Warships; (g) Missiles and missile launchers; and (h) Small arms and light weapons.” Id. Art. 2. The treaty also
covers ammunition and munitions ﬁred, launched or delivered by the above-listed arms as well as the parts and
components which can be assembled into these arms. Id. Arts. 3–4.
7
Id. Art. 13(1).
8
Id. Arts. 6(3), 7(1).
9
United Nations, Depositary Status for the Arms Trade Treaty, at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src¼TREATY&mtdsg_no¼XXVI-8&chapter¼26&clang¼_en#3 [https://perma.cc/WBC2-K34Y] [hereinafter
UN Depositary Status for ATT].
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The UN General Assembly adopted the ATT on April 2, 2013,10 and it entered into force
on December 24, 2014.11 The U.S. secretary of state at the time, John Kerry, signed the ATT
on September 25, 2013, and President Obama transmitted the treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent on December 9, 2016, within his last two months in ofﬁce.12 In his letter
accompanying the transmission, Obama noted that the United States did not need to change
or enact any regulations or laws to comply with the treaty.13 The Senate referred the ATT to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the same date, but no further action has been
taken by the Committee.14
Speaking at an NRA convention on April 26, 2019, Trump publicly announced his intent
to withdraw the ATT from the Senate’s advice and consent process, simultaneously signing a
letter requesting the ATT’s return.15 Trump also stated: “[T]he United States will be revoking the effect of America’s signature from this badly misguided treatment [agreement]. We’re
taking our signature back. The United Nations will soon receive a formal notice that America
is rejecting this treaty.”16 Following Trump’s statement, the White House issued a public
statement reiterating Trump’s announcement “that he will never ratify the ATT and will
ask the Senate to return it.”17 The statement continued:
• The ATT is being opened up for amendment in 2020 and there are potential proposals
that the United States cannot support.
...
• By announcing the United States will not join the ATT, President Trump is ensuring
this agreement will not become a platform to threaten Americans’ Second Amendment
rights.
...
• Currently, 63 countries are completely out of the agreement, including major arms
exporters like Russia and China.
10

GA Res. 67/234B (Apr. 2, 2013).
See ATT, supra note 5, Art. 22 (providing that the treaty would enter into force ninety days after the ﬁftieth
ratiﬁcation or accession); UN Depositary Status for ATT, supra note 9 (listing the date of its entry into force).
12
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Arms Trade Treaty, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
114-14, at III (Dec. 9, 2016).
13
Id. (explaining that “United States national control systems and practices to regulate the international transfer
of conventional arms already meet or exceed the requirements of the Treaty” and adding that a “key goal of the
Treaty is to persuade other States to adopt national control systems for the international transfer of conventional
arms that are closer to our own high standards”); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33865, ARMS CONTROL AND
NONPROLIFERATION: A CATALOG OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 54 (2019) (“Because the United States already has
strong export control laws in place, the ATT would likely require no signiﬁcant changes to policy, regulations, or
law.”).
14
114th Cong., 162 CONG. REC. S6998-7000 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2016) (statement of Sen. Inhofe); 114th
Congress, The Arms Trade Treaty, at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/114th-congress/14 [https://
perma.cc/FBZ7-D857] (showing that the latest action with regard to the ATT was its referral to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee).
15
Trump Announcement, supra note 1, at 6.
16
Id. (second alteration in the original document).
17
White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump is Defending Our Sovereignty and Constitutional
Rights from the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (Apr. 26, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-is-defending-our-sovereignty-and-constitutional-rights-from-the-unitednations-arms-trade-treaty [https://perma.cc/8CFJ-CQ95].
11
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• The ATT cannot achieve its chief objective of addressing irresponsible arms transfers if
these major arms exporters are not subject to it at all.18
Three days later, Trump issued an ofﬁcial letter to the Senate, stating:
I have concluded that it is not in the interest of the United States to become a party to the
Arms Trade Treaty (Senate Treaty Doc. 114-14, transmitted December 9, 2016). I have,
therefore, decided to withdraw the aforementioned treaty from the Senate and accordingly request that it be returned to me.19
Trump’s request to the Senate is not unprecedented. In 1856, President Pierce sent an
analogous request to the Senate, which formally returned the treaty shortly thereafter.20
Since then, this request-and-return procedure has occurred periodically.21 Other presidents
to make this type of request include President Wilson,22 President Franklin D. Roosevelt,23
and President Nixon.24 In the modern era, the Senate’s process for returning a treaty involves
a resolution referred out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which the Senate then
has the opportunity to adopt by a majority vote.25 In a major report prepared in 2001 about
18

Id.
ATT Return Request, supra note 2.
20
On August 9, 1856, Pierce wrote: “Deeming it advisable to withdraw [the treaty between the United States
and the Netherlands] from the consideration of the Senate, I request that it may be returned to me.” 10 J. EXEC.
PROC. S. U.S. 140, 140–41 (1856). On August 13, 1856, after the message was read in the Senate, the Senate
ordered “the convention . . . between the United States and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, be returned
by the Secretary to the President of the United States, agreeably to the request contained in his message dated 9th
August, instant.” Id. at 142.
21
See David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential Power to “Un-Sign” Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1468
(2002) (explaining that the exchange between Pierce and the Senate “provide[d] an initial model to which
most later interactions conform”); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 175 (1990) (“Between
1947 and 1963, forty-ﬁve treaties were withdrawn, in each case pursuant to a request of the President (which
was met by the Senate’s unanimous consent, order, or resolution)”). While presidents often “request” the return
of a treaty from the Senate, there are also examples in which they have used more robust language. See 24 J. EXEC.
PROC. S. U.S. 474, 474 (1885) (quoting President Arthur’s February 18, 1885 message to the Senate “recall[ing]
the treaty” rather than requesting its return); 34 J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 58, 58 (1902) (quoting President Theodore
Roosevelt’s December 8, 1902 message to the Senate “withdraw[ing]” a treaty between the United States and
Dominican Republic rather than asking for the treaty’s return).
22
On March 21, 1918, Wilson requested that the Senate return two treaties previously signed by the United
States and Great Britain; the Senate did so on the same day. See 52 J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 792, 792 (1918).
Additionally, Wilson requested that another treaty between the United States and Great Britain be returned on
January 15, 1920. See 55 J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 83, 83 (1920). The Senate complied with this request two days
later. Id. at 86.
23
On May 7, 1934, Roosevelt submitted a treaty between the United States and Mexico to the Senate and
requested that a treaty previously signed by the two nations be returned. See 75 J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 509,
509 (1934). The Senate returned the treaty on April 1, 1935. See 76 J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 493, 493 (1935).
24
On February 24, 1970, President Nixon requested to withdraw a treaty with Mexico from the Senate. See 112
J. EXEC. PROC. S. U.S. 74, 74–75 (1970). The message was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that same day, id., and the treaty was returned on March 13, 1970. Id. at 117.
25
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106–71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 145 (2001) (“The normal practice for returning treaties has been for the committee to
report out, and for the Senate to adopt, a Senate resolution directing the Secretary of the Senate to return a particular treaty or treaties to the President.”); Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. 113–18, Rule XXX(1)(d) (Jan.
24, 2013) (“On the ﬁnal question to advise and consent to the ratiﬁcation in the form agreed to, the concurrence of
two-thirds of the Senators present shall be necessary to determine it in the afﬁrmative; but all other motions and
questions upon a treaty shall be decided by a majority vote, except a motion to postpone indeﬁnitely, which shall
be decided by a vote of two-thirds.”).
19
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the role of the Senate with respect to treaties and other international agreements, the
Congressional Research Service stated: “The President does not have the formal authority
to withdraw a treaty from Senate consideration without the Senate’s concurrence.”26
Historically, the Senate has apparently always consented to the return of a treaty requested
by the president.27 This may stem in part from the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional
practice, treaties can only be ratiﬁed with the concurrence of the president, and the president
is under no legal obligation to ratify a treaty even after the Senate has given its advice and
consent.28
For the ATT, Senator Rand Paul, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
presented a resolution to return the treaty to Trump approximately two weeks after Trump’s
formal request to the Senate.29 As of late September of 2019, the Committee had not yet
acted on the resolution.30
Trump did not wait for the Senate to return the ATT before communicating to the United
Nations that the United States did not intend to become a party to the ATT. On July 18,
2019, his administration sent the following message to the UN secretary-general:
This is to inform you, in connection with the Arms Trade Treaty, done at New York on
April 2, 2013, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty.
Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on
September 25, 2013.
The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this
letter, be reﬂected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty, and all other publicly available media relating to the treaty be updated to reﬂect this intention not to
become a party.31
This language closely tracks language from Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties regarding the duration of international legal obligations arising from treaty
26

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106–71, supra note 25, at 145; see also GLENNON, supra note 21, at 174–75
(observing that since “the President (should the Senate give its consent) retains the discretion to decline to proceed
to ratiﬁcation, it might seem sensible that the President can withdraw a treaty from the Senate without its consent”
but that “[n]onetheless, practicality argues against such presidential authority, since at that point the Senate, not
the President, has custody of the ofﬁcial treaty documents; they are not then within the President’s control”); but
see Scott, supra note 21, at 1477 (arguing that the president should have “the unilateral power . . . to withdraw
treaties from the Senate,” including “in order to ‘un-sign’ it”).
27
Scott, supra note 21, at 1471; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303, rep. n. 4
(2018) (“The President may also request that a treaty be withdrawn from further Senate consideration, and as a
matter of practice the Senate has cooperated with such requests.”).
28
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106–71, supra note 25, at 152 (“U.S. law does not impose any legal obligation
on the President to ratify a treaty after the Senate has given its advice and consent.”).
29
165 CONG. REC. S2792-2793 (daily ed. May 13, 2019) (statement of Sen. Paul); U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Committee Membership, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/about/membership [https://
perma.cc/9QCJ-MZG9].
30
S. Res. 204, supra note 3. Notably, U.S. Senator Bob Menendez, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, issued a statement on April 26, 2019, criticizing Trump’s announcement. See U.S. Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations Ranking Member’s Press, Menendez on Pres. Trump Telling NRA He is Cancelling
U.S. Participation in Global Arms Treaty (Apr. 26, 2019), at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/
release/menendez-on-pres-trump-telling-nra-he-is-cancelling-us-participation-in-global-arms-treaty [https://
perma.cc/5JMN-C7NA].
31
Unsigning Letter, supra note 4.
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signature. Article 18 provides that, after it has signed a treaty, “[a] State is obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [this] treaty . . . until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.”32 A common interpretation of
this provision is that a state party may not act in such a manner that would make it impossible
or substantially more difﬁcult for the state to ultimately comply with the treaty.33
An earlier example—the initial example34—of treaty “unsigning” by the United States
occurred when the administration of President George W. Bush sent an analogous letter
to the United Nations in 2002 in connection with the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court.35 The Rome Statute was in a different procedural posture
than the ATT, however, because it had not yet been submitted to the Senate for advice
and consent.36 Thus, Trump’s unsigning is the ﬁrst time a United States president has
unsigned a treaty at a time when, as a matter of U.S. domestic legal procedure, the treaty
was pending before the Senate. Few commentators have thus considered whether such an
action is permissible as a matter of U.S. constitutional law or whether the Trump administration’s notiﬁcation to the United Nations can be taken as adequate for purposes of Article
18 at a time when the treaty is pending before the Senate.37
32
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679. Although
the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it views many aspects of the treaty as reﬂective of customary international law. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/DK9B-H4V3].
33
Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2078 (2003); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Unratiﬁed
Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 329 (2007) (“[Article 18’s] drafting
history suggests that the object and purpose obligation is designed to ensure that one of the signatory parties . . .
does not change the status quo in a way that eliminates or substantially undermines the reasons for entering into
the treaty.”).
34
Swaine, supra note 33, at 2064 (noting that the Bush unsigning was “apparently unprecedented”). At the
beginning of his administration, Trump similarly unsigned the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Agreement—an internationally binding agreement that President Obama had signed, although one that, as a matter of U.S. domestic
constitutional practice, was intended to receive the approval of Congress rather than of two-thirds of the Senate.
See Letter from the Acting U.S. Trade Representative to the TPP Depositary (Jan. 30, 2017), available at https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/Press/Releases/1-30-17%20USTR%20Letter%20to%20TPP%20Depositary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2V4X-BPJ4] (stating that “the United States does not intend to become a party to the TransPaciﬁc Partnership Agreement” and therefore “has no legal obligations arising from its signature on February 4,
2016”).
35
See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Koﬁ
Annan (May 6, 2002), at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm [https://perma.cc/V227T5TQ]. In language that appears to be the model for the ATT Unsigning Letter, the letter stated: “This is to
inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17,
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States
has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reﬂected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this
treaty.” Id.
36
President Clinton authorized the signing of the Rome Statute in the last weeks of his administration, but he
did not submit it to the Senate for advice and consent. William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the
International Criminal Court (Dec. 31, 2000), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-200101-08/pdf/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf (stating that “I will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisﬁed”).
37
Among the sparse examples are Scott, supra note 21, at 1475 (asserting that “if the President asks for the
return of the treaty, but the Senate denies his request . . . it appears the President cannot ‘unsign’ the treaty,”
although also arguing that the president can unilaterally force the return of the treaty from the Senate); Ryan
Chorkey Burke, Note, Losers Always Whine About Their Test: American Nuclear Testing, International Law, and
the International Court of Justice, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 341, 361 (2011) (claiming that “[o]nce the President
submits a treaty for the Advice and Consent of the Senate, however, the document becomes the legal property of
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Senate Gives Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of Four Bilateral Tax Treaties
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.58

In July of 2019, the U.S. Senate gave advice and consent to protocols updating tax treaties
with Spain, Switzerland, Japan, and Luxembourg, after a nearly decade-long period during
which no tax treaties were approved by the Senate. This drought was primarily due to the
privacy concerns of a single senator, Rand Paul of Kentucky, who deployed the Senate’s procedural rules to increase the difﬁculty of the advice and consent process. Tax treaties with
Hungary, Chile, and Poland, as well as a protocol to a multilateral tax convention, remained
pending in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as of mid-August of 2019.
Bilateral tax treaties typically focus on some combination of reducing double taxation and
deterring tax avoidance. In the years leading up to 2011, the Senate generally gave its advice
and consent to these treaties within a year or two of their signing.1 Senator Paul’s opposition,
which began shortly after he joined the Senate in 2011, changed this pattern.2
In a 2014 letter, Senator Paul explained that his concern with pending tax treaties stemmed
from provisions that, in his view, increased the scope of authority of tax ofﬁcials to share and
ascertain taxpayer information and represented a departure from individual privacy rights:

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, making it impossible for the President to unsign it until it is returned”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
1
E.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Tax Convention with Malta, 111th
Cong., 156 CONG. REC. S5976 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (signed Aug. 8, 2008; advice and consent on July 15,
2010); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Protocol Amending Tax Convention with New Zealand,
111th Cong., 156 CONG. REC. S5976 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (signed Dec. 1, 2008; advice and consent on July
15, 2010); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Protocol Amending Tax
Convention with France, 111th Cong., 155 CONG. REC. S12350-S12351 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2009) (signed Jan.
13, 2009; advice and consent on Dec. 3, 2009); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of
the Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada, 110th Cong., 154 CONG. REC. S9332 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 2008) (signed Sept. 21, 2007; advice and consent on Sept. 23, 2008); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Tax Convention and Protocol with Bulgaria with Proposed Protocol of
Amendment, 110th Cong., 154 CONG. REC. S9332 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008) (signed Feb. 26, 2008; advice
and consent on Sept. 23, 2008); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Tax
Convention with Iceland, 110th Cong., 154 CONG. REC. S9332 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008) (signed Oct. 23,
2007; advice and consent on Sept. 23, 2008); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of
the Tax Convention with Belgium, 110th Cong., 153 CONG. REC. S15706 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (signed Nov.
27, 2006; advice and consent on Dec. 14, 2007); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of
the Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Germany, 110th Cong., 153 CONG. REC. S15706 (daily ed. Dec.
14, 2007) (signed June 1, 2006; advice and consent on Dec. 14, 2007); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Denmark, 110th Cong., 153 CONG.
REC. S14654 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (signed May 2, 2006; advice and consent on Nov. 16, 2007); U.S.
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratiﬁcation of the Protocol Amending Tax Convention with
Finland, 110th Cong., 153 CONG. REC. S14654 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (signed May 31, 2006; advice and
consent on Nov. 16, 2007).
2
See Diane M. Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Example, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1185, 1197–207 (2016) (describing Paul’s concerns and his method of delaying the treaties); see also Jim
Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties for First Time in Decade, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/tax-treaties-vote.html (“Mr. Paul has long objected to those informationsharing provisions on privacy grounds, and he succeeded for years in holding up approval of the treaties.”).
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Previous tax treaties were more focused on information speciﬁc to suspicions of tax fraud
while requiring that serious allegations of tax wrongdoing were grounded in evidence.
However, these new bulk collection treaties demand Americans’ records under a vague standard that allows the government to access personal ﬁnancial information that “may be relevant” through information exchanges between the U.S. and foreign governments—a
standard extended to other governments, as well. This new, much lower and ambiguous
threshold allows the government to access bank records for hardly any reason at all.
...
I certainly do not condone tax cheats, but I can’t support a law that endangers regular foreign
investment and punishes every American in pursuit of a few tax cheats. Most importantly, I
cannot support a bulk collection tax treaty that has complete disregard for the important protections provided to every American by the Fourth Amendment.3
Senator Paul also cited the potential for these tax treaties to lead to implementation of a recently
passed domestic law which, in his view, was also problematic with respect to taxpayer privacy.4
Of the four tax treaties that recently received advice and consent, the earliest treaty
(Luxembourg) was submitted to the Senate in 2010.5 The following year, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee voted to send the protocol to the full Senate, but Senator
Paul invoked a procedural rule to make it challenging for entire Senate to vote on this
protocol. The usual process for bringing a treaty to a vote on the Senate ﬂoor requires the
unanimous consent of the Senate. In a break from common practice, Senator Paul began
registering objections to tax treaties that prevented such unanimous consent.6 While the
Senate could have overridden Paul’s request by voting in favor of cloture (a vote which
would require sixty Senators in its favor), this could have led to delays in the other business
of the Senate. If cloture occurs, Senate Rule XXII establishes that the issue in question “shall
be the unﬁnished business to the exclusion of all other business until disposed of,” which may
amount to up to thirty hours of debate.7 Given the other considerations facing the Senate, its
membership opted not to seek cloture on the tax treaties reported out favorably by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee between 2011 and 2018.8
In June of 2019, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee once again reported the protocols with Spain, Switzerland, Japan, and Luxembourg favorably out of committee.9 The U.S.
3

Letter from Rand Paul, U.S. Senator, to Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (May 7, 2014), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/PaulLetter050714.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HT9-FPNP].
4
Id.; see also Letter from Coalition of 23 Groups to Congress (Mar. 21, 2017), available at http://freedomand
prosperity.org/ﬁles/2017-FATCA_repeal_coalition_ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWW4-MLAU] (expressing concerns similar with respect to Paul’s); see also John S. Wisiackas, Comment, Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act: What It Could Mean for the Future of Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
585, 606 (2017) (noting that Senator Paul’s court case against this domestic law was dismissed for lack of standing
and that the underlying information sharing policies of this law have not been ruled unconstitutional to date).
5
Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Luxembourg, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-8 (2010).
6
See Ring, supra note 2, at 1205.
7
Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII(2), S. Doc. No. 113-18 (2013), at https://www.rules.senate.gov/
rules-of-the-senate; Ring, supra note 2, at 1197–207.
8
See Ring, supra note 2, at 1197–207.
9
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman’s Press Release, Four Tax Treaties Approved in Foreign
Relations Committee Business Meeting (June 26, 2019), at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/
four-tax-treaties-approved-in-foreign-relations-committee-business-meeting- (quoting the Chair, Senator Jim
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Chamber of Commerce and multiple U.S. corporations strongly supported their approval.10
On July 11, with the support of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, motions for cloture for all four treaties were brought to the Senate ﬂoor.11 On July 16, the Senate voted for
cloture on the protocol with Spain by a vote of 94 to 1, with Paul casting the sole “no” vote.12
Following debate, the Senate then advised and consented to this protocol on the same day by a
vote of 94 to 2, with the two “no” votes coming from Paul and Senator Mike Lee of Utah.13
Presumably following an understanding reached with Paul, the cloture motions were withdrawn on the other three treaties and unanimous consent was given for votes to be held with
respect to them.14 On July 17, these three treaties were approved by overwhelming majorities.15 As of mid-August 2019, none of the treaties have yet been ratiﬁed by the president.
During the debate over these treaties in the Senate, Paul was chided for his delaying tactics
by McConnell who, like Paul, is a Republican Senator from Kentucky. McConnell remarked:
[T]he years of delays in getting these noncontroversial treaties ratiﬁed have cost American
businesses that employ American workers millions and millions of dollars.
...
I was curious to hear one colleague of ours come to the ﬂoor yesterday and passionately
argue against what I have done as majority leader to support these agreements. . . .
At every step, executive branch ofﬁcials and Senate colleagues have tried to engage his
concerns in good faith. But for 6 years in the case of the Spain treaty, 8 years with respect
to Switzerland, and 9 years with respect to Luxembourg, he was unable to persuade anyone—over 9 years. In all of that time, no one was persuaded, partly because the changes
he demanded don’t solve a real problem, partly because they would have forced reopening the treaties for even more negotiations, and partly because everybody else was actually
listening to the job creators who have been pleading with us for years to get this millstone
Risch, as saying: “[T]hese treaties have languished and awaited ratiﬁcation for nearly a decade, and are incredibly
important to our own citizens. I appreciate Leader McConnell’s commitment to moving these treaties. I look forward to working with him to see that they are ratiﬁed by the full Senate.”).
10
See, e.g., Letter from Business Roundtable et al. to James Risch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations (Apr. 11, 2019), available at https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019Trade-Association-Letter-on-Tax-Treaties-to-all-Senate-Leadership-Risch-Letter-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SQ5U-QJEV]; Letter from Neil L. Bradley, Exec. Vice President, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, to James E. Risch & Bob Menendez, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (June 20, 2019), available at
https://www.uschamber.com/letters-congress/us-chamber-letter-tax-treaties [https://perma.cc/PHU2-FHAB].
11
116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4795-S4797 (daily ed. July 11, 2019).
12
116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4847 (daily ed. July 16, 2019).
13
U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Spain, 116th
Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4850 (daily ed. July 16, 2019).
14
165 CONG. REC. S4795-S4797 Supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Risch and the noted lack of objection to his
request for unanimous consent). Senator Risch also noted that the Senate would have an opportunity to vote on an
amendment proposed by Paul to the resolution of advice and consent for the Spain protocol. Id. The amendment
was rejected by an overwhelming majority. 116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4849 (daily ed. July 16, 2019) (rejecting Paul’s proposed amendment, with the vote being four in favor and ninety-two against).
15
116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4875-S4878 (daily ed. July 17, 2019) (including the roll call for the treaties,
which passed 95–2 (Japan), 95–2 (Switzerland), and 93–3 (Luxembourg)). The “no” votes on the treaties were
Paul and Lee and, for the Luxembourg treaty, Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois. Id. Durbin had previously
expressed skepticism about the importance of the Luxembourg treaty measured against other legislative priorities.
116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4830 (daily ed. July 16, 2019) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
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off their necks. There were 9 years—9 years of rejecting reasonable counteroffers and
accommodations, 9 years of working to hold up these treaties and trying to sell the
Obama administration, the Trump administration, and his Senate colleagues on an
off-the-wall story that failed to persuade anyone.
Look, I am a patient man, but my patience is not inexhaustible. After unanimous consent
was denied on multiple occasions, I determined, after consulting with the Treasury
Secretary and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that I would prepare
to ﬁle cloture on these tax protocols. . . .
...
Year after year, money that could have been immediately used to hire Americans or make
new investments had to either be frozen up or handed over in duplicate taxes—all in large
part because one of our colleagues could not accept that one single senator who hasn’t
persuaded his fellow Members is not entitled to singlehandedly rewrite international
treaties.16
Following the passage of these four tax protocols, the Senate continues to have before it bilateral tax treaties with Hungary, Chile, and Poland, as well as a protocol to a multilateral tax
treaty.17 All of these treaties had been reported favorably out by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in prior years,18 only to fail to receive ﬂoor votes and therefore be returned
to the Committee at the end of the legislative session. The three bilateral treaties remain stalled
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, apparently due in part to a Treasury Department
request for the addition of a new reservation to each treaty.19 It remains to be seen when these
treaties will advance out of committee and, if so, whether they will receive ﬂoor votes.

16

116th Cong., 165 CONG. REC. S4872-S4873 (daily ed. July 17, 2019) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate (July 17, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/treaties-pend
ing-in-the-senate [https://perma.cc/FF4Z-2ZDV].
18
For the earlier actions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reporting these treaties out of committee, see
Tax Convention with Hungary, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-4 (2011), at https://www.congress.gov/congressionalreport/112th-congress/executive-report/4 [https://perma.cc/HM2P-GDDW]; Tax Convention with Chile,
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 113-9 (2014), at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-congress/executivereport/9 [https://perma.cc/PG53-Z529]; Tax Convention with Poland, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 113-11 (2014), at
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-congress/executive-report/11 [https://perma.cc/GE35BUVC]; Protocol Amending Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,
S. EXEC. REP. 113-8 (2014), at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-congress/executive-report/8.
19
See Letter from Robert Menendez, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, to
Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Treasury (June 11, 2019), available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/06-11-19%20RM%20letter%20to%20Mnuchin%20re%20Tax%20Treaties.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4PYE-LXHJ] (expressing concern and confusion about a reservation the Treasury Department sought to add
concerning the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” and enquiring whether this addition would require the international
renegotiation of these treaties).
17
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade Organization,
Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.59

With only three remaining members of what is supposed to be a seven-member body, the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body may soon cease to function. Since
2016, the United States has blocked the reappointment of Appellate Body members and
rejected over a dozen proposals to launch selection processes that could ﬁll the remaining
vacancies. As a lead reason for these blocks, the United States has cited concerns about the
practice whereby members whose terms have expired continue to serve on appeals to which
they were previously appointed. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body
members will expire, leaving only one member remaining. Because the WTO’s dispute settlement process requires three Appellate Body members for each appeal, WTO members will
be unable to make any new appeals by this year’s end unless a solution emerges to the current
impasse.
When a conﬂict arises between WTO member states over an obligation, members often
proceed through the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism. The mechanism, as laid out by
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), consists of consultations, a panel report, and,
if the parties choose, an appeal before three members of the WTO Appellate Body.1 The
Appellate Body is comprised of seven persons who each serve for a four-year term with the
possibility of a one-time reappointment.2 Through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
representatives from all WTO member states select Appellate Body members using the practice of consensus, which means that any matter submitted for the DSB’s consideration is
accepted—unless a present member “formally objects to the proposed decision.”3 The
three members of the Appellate Body appointed for a particular case have the authority to
“uphold, modify or reverse” panel-made legal conclusions or interpretations and must
issue their report within ninety days.4 In practice, Appellate Body reports provide the only
1

Lasting from 1986 to 1994, the Uruguay Round of Negotiations established the current dispute resolution
system. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Basics: The Uruguay Round, at https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm. After consultation attempts and a request by the complaining
party, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) selects a panel to issue a report including factual ﬁndings and legal
conclusions. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Arts. 4, 6, 7, 11, 12,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 [hereinafter DSU]. The panel’s ﬁnal report is circulated to all
WTO members and, unless appealed or rejected by consensus, becomes the DSB’s ﬁnal ruling or recommendation. Id. Art. 16.
2
DSU, supra note 1, Art. 17(1)–(2). The DSU provides that the Appellate Body should be comprised of “persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the
covered agreements generally.” Id. Art. 17(3).
3
WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Arts. IV(2)–(3), IX(1),
n. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; DSU, supra note 1, Arts.
2(4), 17(2).
4
DSU, supra note 1, Arts. 17(6), 17(13). Speciﬁcally, appellate proceedings “shall not exceed 60 days from the
date a party to the dispute formally notiﬁes its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its
report.” Id. Art. 17(5). If the Appellate Body is unable to circulate a report within sixty days, it must “inform
the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay” and “[i]n no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.” Id.
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avenue for obtaining a binding resolution in many WTO disputes since, once a panel report
has been appealed, the DSB cannot act on the matter until the completion of the appeal.5
Currently, the Appellate Body only has three serving members, two of whom have second
terms ending on December 10, 2019.6 The Appellate Body’s low member count is due
mainly to the United States’ continued objections to reappointments and to the selection processes for new Appellate Body members over the last three years.7 Under the Obama administration, the United States objected in 2016 to the reappointment of Seung Wha Chang
(South Korea), citing its view that Chang had deviated from Appellate Body responsibilities.8
The administration of President Trump has raised still broader concerns about the WTO
Appellate Body. During Trump’s ﬁrst year as president, Mexico introduced a joint proposal
by dozens of WTO member states urging that the DSB launch a selection process to ﬁll three
upcoming Appellate Body vacancies.9 The United States refused to support the proposal
because one of the Appellate Body members had “continue[d] to serve on an appeal, despite
ceasing to be a member of the Appellate Body nearly 5 [ﬁve] months ago.”10 The practice of
Appellate Body members serving on appeals past their term is rooted in Rule 15 of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, which provides:

Unless the DSB “decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members,” it adopts the report, and the parties to the dispute must accept the Appellate Body’s
holdings. Id. Art. 17(14).
5
See DSU, supra note 1, Art. 16. In a drafted reform proposal, the European Union expressed concern that
without a functioning Appellate Body, “any party to the dispute may attempt to block the adoption of panel rulings (by appealing it) . . . .” Council of the European Union, Note for the Attention of the Trade Policy Committee:
WTO – EU’s Proposals on WTO Modernisation, at 14, WK 8329/2018 INIT (July 5, 2018), available at http://src.
bna.com/Aoe [https://perma.cc/CQ4S-3N2N] [hereinafter Drafted EU Proposal].
6
These two members are Ujal Singh Bhatia (India) and Thomas R. Graham (United States). World Trade
Organization, Dispute Settlement Members: Appellate Body Members, at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5CVE-J2H5]. Their terms will end on December 10,
2019, leaving only Hong Zhao (China) remaining until his ﬁrst term ends on November 30, 2020. Id. It remains
to be seen whether Graham will continue to participate in appeals that were pending prior to the end of his term.
Should he not do so, then the Appellate Body would be without a quorum for those appeals as well as for new ones.
See Simon Lester, Clarifying Tom Graham’s Status on the Appellate Body, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 23,
2019), at https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/09/clarifying-tom-grahams-status-on-the-appellate-body.html
(reporting that Graham had made a “neutral statement about being undecided on how to approach cases after
the expiration of his term”).
7
The U.S. decision to block reappointments or initial appointments is not unprecedented. For a discussion
about two blocks the United States made in 2011 and 2014, see Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis
Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 573, 576 (2016).
8
Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 1 (May 23, 2016),
available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ML7M-8T9X]. For more detailed information about the United States’ 2016 decision to block Chang’s reappointment to the WTO Appellate Body, see generally Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 7.
9
Proposal by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609,
at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼243206,
241536,240077&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼2&FullTextHash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&Has
FrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/WRK7-CVJM]; World Trade Organization
Press Release, WTO Sets Up Panel to Review UAE Measures on Goods, Services, IP Rights (Nov. 22, 2017), at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dsb_22nov17_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8NLG-P4QZ].
10
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 13 (Nov. 22,
2017), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Nov22.DSB_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E6KB-CH9F] [hereinafter November 2017 U.S. Statement].
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A person who ceases to be a Member of the Appellate Body may, with the authorization
of the Appellate Body and upon notiﬁcation to the DSB, complete the disposition of any
appeal to which that person was assigned while a Member, and that person shall, for that
purpose only, be deemed to continue to be a Member of the Appellate Body.11
Although the Appellate Body has unquestioned authority to draft and implement appellate
procedural rules, the United States speciﬁcally takes issue with Rule 15 insofar as the rule
allows the Appellate Body “to deem someone who is not an Appellate Body member to be
a member.”12 The United States has pointed to Article 17(2) of the DSU which states in full:
The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and
each person may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons
appointed immediately after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at
the end of two years, to be determined by lot. Vacancies shall be ﬁlled as they arise. A
person appointed to replace a person whose term of ofﬁce has not expired shall hold ofﬁce
for the remainder of the predecessor’s term.13
The United States explained in a statement that under Article 17(2), “the DSB has a responsibility under the DSU to decide whether a person whose term of appointment has expired
should continue serving,” and that “Members need to discuss and resolve that issue ﬁrst
before moving on to the issue of replacing such a person.”14
From January to May 2018, member states submitted the proposal to ﬁll the three vacancies four more times, each time with additional WTO member states joining the proposal.15
The United States continued to reject the proposals, again citing to Rule 15:
11

Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010). The
rules as they existed at the time of this writing can be found permanently here: https://perma.cc/A7GH-L3EX.
12
The DSU provides that “[w]orking procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with
the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.”
DSU, supra note 1, Art. 17(9). For an articulation of the U.S. position on this issue, see OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, at 25–26 (2018), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/Press/
Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/TZP9-SJFC].
13
DSU, supra note 1, Art. 17(2).
14
November 2017 U.S. Statement, supra note 10, at 13.
15
Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609/
Rev.1 (Jan. 11, 2018), at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼
E&CatalogueIdList¼243206,241536,240077&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼1&FullTextHash¼371857150&
HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/DE3GMNH5]; Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.2 (Feb. 15, 2018), at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?
language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼243206,241536,240077&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼0&FullTextHash¼371857
150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/G2GPQ2AG]; Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/
W/609/Rev.3 (Apr. 16, 2018), at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?
language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼255590,254971,253363,252364,251578,250293,249527,248090,2452
55,244608&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼9&FullTextHash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrench
Record¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/G72H-RUV8]; Proposal by Argentina, Australia,
Bolivia, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.4 (May 17, 2018), at https://
docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼255590,254971,
253363,252364,251578,250293,249527,248090,245255,244608&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼8&FullText
Hash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://
perma.cc/QEC7-XN3Z].
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For at least the past 8 months, the United States has been raising and explaining the systemic concerns that arise from the Appellate Body’s decisions that purport to “deem” as
an Appellate Body member someone whose term of ofﬁce has expired and thus is no longer an Appellate Body member, pursuant to its Working Procedures for Appellate Review
(Rule 15).
...
[U]nlike other international tribunals . . . , Rule 15 is not set out in the constitutive text of
the WTO dispute settlement system—that is, the DSU. It has therefore not been agreed
to by WTO Members.16
In August 2018, another appellate body member, Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing,
faced an approaching end date to his ﬁrst term.17 Causing the fourth vacancy on the Appellate
Body, the United States announced at a WTO meeting that it “[was] not prepared to support
[his] reappointment.”18 The United States explained that its position was “no reﬂection on
any one individual but reﬂect[ed] [its] principled concerns.”19 The United States again
grounded its decision in Rule 15 while also articulating several new areas of contention:
The United States has raised repeated concerns that appellate reports have gone far
beyond the text setting out WTO rules in varied areas, such as subsidies, antidumping
duties, anti-subsidy duties, standards and technical barriers to trade, and safeguards,
restricting the ability of the United States to regulate in the public interest or protect
U.S. workers and businesses against unfair trading practices.
On procedural, systemic issues, for example, the Appellate Body has issued advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, reviewed panel fact-ﬁnding despite appeals
being limited to legal issues, asserted that panels must follow its reports although there is no
system of precedent in the WTO, and continuously disregarded the 90-day mandatory
deadline for appeals—all contrary to the WTO’s agreed dispute settlement rules.
And for the last year, the United States has been calling for WTO Members to correct the
situation where the Appellate Body acts as if it has the power to permit ex-Appellate Body
members to continue to decide appeals even after their term of ofﬁce—as set by the WTO
Members—has expired. This so-called “Rule 15” is, on its face, another example of the
Appellate Body’s disregard for the WTO’s rules.
16

Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 23 (May 28,
2018), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/May28.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.
ﬁn_.public.Rev_.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z2P-PUSY].
17
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 38 (Aug. 27, 2018),
available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Aug27.DSB_.Stmt_.as-delivered.ﬁn_.
public.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6MC-PYBX] [hereinafter August 2018 U.S. Statement]; Proposal by Argentina,
Australia, Bolivia, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.5 (Sept. 13, 2018), at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼255590,
254971,253363,252364,251578,250293,249527,248090,245255,244608&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼7&
FullTextHash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True
[https://perma.cc/RGX7-NVQ8].
18
August 2018 U.S. Statement, supra note 17, at 38.
19
Id.
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Our concerns have not been addressed. . . .20
In an attempt to address the persistent U.S. refusal to permit the selection of new Appellate
Body members, the European Union, China, Canada, Mexico, and several other WTO
member states submitted a proposal at the December 12, 2018 WTO General Council
Meeting.21 The member states expressed “deep[] concern[] that the enduring absence of consensus in the [DSB] to ﬁll the vacancies on the Appellate Body risks undermining the viability
of the WTO dispute settlement system.”22 The proposal suggested ﬁve different amendments
to the DSU which involved: (1) permitting outgoing Appellate Body members to “complete
the disposition of a pending appeal in which a hearing has already taken place during that
member’s term”; (2) allowing parties to agree to extend the ninety-day timeframe in which
Appellate Body panels must issue a report; (3) requiring clariﬁcation that issues of law and
legal interpretation “do not include the meaning itself of [] municipal measures” in panel
reports; (4) “provid[ing] that the Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised on
appeal by the parties to the dispute to the extent this is necessary for the resolution of the
dispute”; and (5) hosting annual meetings between the Appellate Body and the DSB
where members can discuss the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence.23 Stressing the proposal’s
importance, Commissioner Malmström of the European Union stated that “[t]he appellate
body function of the WTO dispute settlement system is moving towards a cliff’s edge” and
that “[w]ithout this core function of the WTO, the world would lose a system that has
ensured stability in global trade for decades.”24
The United States responded with disinterest to the proposed amendments, although it
provided little reasoning as to why the proposals were unacceptable or unworkable:
20
Id. at 37. Following the U.S. announcement, Trump told news reporters that if the WTO did not “shape up,”
he would withdraw the United States from the WTO. John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev & Jennifer Jacobs,
Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of WTO if It Doesn’t “Shape Up,” BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2018), at https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-if-they-don-t-shapeup. Trump recently threatened to leave the WTO again during a visit to Pennsylvania. White House Press Release,
Remarks by President Trump on American Energy and Manufacturing | Monaca, PA (Aug. 13, 2019), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-american-energy-manufacturing-monacopa/ [https://perma.cc/7H5R-DUHU] (“We were losing all our cases in the World Trade Organization. Almost
every case, we were — lost, lost, lost. They thought we were stupid. . . . We will leave, if we have to. And all of the
sudden, we’re winning a lot of cases.”). The U.S. congressional act implementing the WTO’s Uruguay Round of
Agreements provides that “[t]he approval of the Congress . . . of the WTO Agreement shall cease to be effective if,
and only if, a joint resolution . . . is enacted into law . . . .” 19 U.S.C.A. § 3535(b)(1). The implementing legislation
further speciﬁes that such a joint resolution will employ the following text: “That the Congress withdraws its
approval, provided under section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the WTO Agreement as
deﬁned in section 2(9) of that Act.” Id. § 3535(c)(1).
21
Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland,
Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/752
(Nov. 26, 2018), available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157514.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VP6L-GDAZ] [hereinafter December 2018 Reform Proposal]. This proposal was an adaptation of one originally drafted in mid-2018. Drafted EU Proposal, supra note 5.
22
December 2018 Reform Proposal, supra note 21, at 1.
23
Id. at 1–3.
24
European Comm’n Press Release, WTO Reform: EU Proposes Way Forward on the Functioning of the
Appellate Body (Nov. 26, 2018), at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6529_en.htm [https://perma.
cc/F65E-PEB9].
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We recognize the proposals presented by some WTO Members at the December 12
meeting of the General Council. These proposals to some extent acknowledge the systemic concern the United States has been raising in the WTO for years—namely, that
the Appellate Body has strayed from the role agreed for it by WTO Members.
...
However, on a close reading, the proposals would not effectively address the concerns
that WTO Members have raised. The United States has made its views on these issues
very clear: if WTO Members say that we support a rules-based trading system, then the
Appellate Body must follow the rules we agreed in 1995.25
Despite the apparent U.S. intransigence, member states continued to request a selection
process be launched to ﬁll the body’s four vacancies.26 Beginning in June 2019, member
states requested two additional selection processes be launched for Mr. Ujal Singh Bhatia
and Mr. Thomas Graham, who both have their second four-year terms ending on
December 10, 2019.27 At an August 15 meeting, the United States rejected this proposal
to ﬁll the now six vacancies that will exist on the Appellate Body.28
Several member states have questioned whether the U.S. practice of Appellate Body blocking violates Article 17(2) of the DSU, which states that “[v]acancies shall be ﬁlled as they
arise.”29 At a DSB meeting earlier this year, over twenty WTO member states tried to present
the argument that Article 17(2) places a legal obligation on the United States and all other
members to ﬁll appellate body vacancies.30 The United States responded to these concerns
with the following:
25

Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 44 (Dec. 18,
2018), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Dec18.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.
ﬁn_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4HS-RWF6]. In this statement, the United States also provided an extensive
legal analysis for why it believes the Appellate Body engages in a “misguided” practice when it uses reports as precedents “absent cogent reasons.” Id. at 10–35.
26
See Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Benin, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10
(Apr. 15, 2019), at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E
&CatalogueIdList¼256059,255590,254971,253363,252364,251578,250293,249527,248090,245255&Curr
entCatalogueIdIndex¼3&FullTextHash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&
HasSpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/38JA-4RMZ].
27
Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Benin, et al., Appellate Body Appointments, WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.11
(June 13, 2019), at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&
CatalogueIdList¼256059,255590,254971,253363,252364,251578,250293,249527,248090,245255&Current
CatalogueIdIndex¼2&FullTextHash¼371857150&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&Has
SpanishRecord¼True [https://perma.cc/XRW5-F2TK].
28
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 30 (Aug. 15,
2019), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Aug15.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.
ﬁn_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KGG-J7YL].
29
DSU, supra note 1, Art. 17(2) (emphasis added).
30
World Trade Organization Press Release, Members Consider Thai Request for Panel to Rule on Turkish Air
Conditioner Duties (Feb. 25, 2019), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_25feb19_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/AQW5-HV8V]. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru also presented Article 17(2)’s “shall” language regarding the Appellate Body selection process in late 2017.
Communication from Argentina, Brazil, et al., Proposal Regarding the Appellate Body Selection Process,
WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/596/Rev.5 (Oct. 12, 2017), available at https://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Proposal-Appellate-Body-Selection-Process-Ar-Bz-Col-Chil-Guat-Mex-Peru.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4F5A-8GVY].
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We note that several Members, including Mexico, the EU, Canada, and China, have referenced the “shall” in the third sentence of Article 17.2 of the DSU.
We would ask these Members to share their views on the “shall” in the ﬁrst sentence of
that article. That sentence reads, in part, that “[t]he DSB shall appoint persons to serve on
the Appellate Body. . .”.
Do these Members agree that this provision makes clear that it is the DSB that has the
authority to appoint and reappoint members of the Appellate Body? And that the DSB—
not the Appellate Body—has the responsibility to decide whether a person whose term of
appointment has expired should continue serving, as if a member of the Appellate Body,
on any pending appeals?
Can these Members share their views on the “shall” in Article 17.5 of the DSU? As the
text of Article 17.5 provides that “[i]n no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days”, do
these Members agree that the Appellate Body breaches this provision when it issues a
report beyond the 90-day deadline?
What are these Members’ views on the “shall” in Article 17.6? This article provides that
“[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” Do these Members agree that the Appellate Body
does not respect this text when it engages in review of panel ﬁndings of fact?
We look forward to hearing these Members’ views on these questions.31
Although the United States skirted the issue of whether it has an obligation to ﬁll vacancies on
the Appellate Body, a recent statement by U.S. Ambassador Dennis Shea at the WTO
General Council Meeting recognized that the term “shall” is “mandatory” with respect to
the rule requiring the Appellate Body to issue a report within ninety days of an appeal.32
Some practitioners and scholars have suggested various workarounds that could be used if
the ongoing disagreements are not resolved. During his farewell speech, former Appellate
Body member Peter Van den Bossche suggested that “if consensus among all WTO members
on such reforms is not possible, a coalition of willing WTO members should consider establishing a new parallel dispute settlement system that would copy the existing, but dysfunctional, DSU, in order to settle WTO disputes between them in an orderly and rules-based
manner.”33 Jennifer Hillman has suggested turning to an arbitration process in place of the
dispute settlement mechanism using Article 25 of the DSU.34 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has
31

Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 13–14 (Feb. 25,
2019), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Feb25.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.
ﬁn_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4JF-Z4TN] (formatting omitted).
32
U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Statements Delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea –
WTO General Council Meeting (July 23, 2019), at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-deliveredby-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-july-23-2019 [https://perma.cc/YZ5F-XR8Y].
33
World Trade Organization Press Release, Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Peter Van den Bossche
(May 28, 2019), at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/farwellspeech_peter_van_den_bossche_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RA7-TT7K].
34
Jennifer Hillman, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly?, INST. INT’L ECON. L., at 8–9 (2018), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf. Article 25 states that “[e]xpeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate the solution of certain disputes
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suggested interpreting the foundational agreements underlying the WTO in a way that offers
an escape valve from the consensus procedure with respect to the selection of Appellate Body
members.35
The Trump administration has been less than clear in articulating a path forward.36 As of
mid-August, there is no indication that the United States will agree to a solution before this
December when the terms for two of the three remaining Appellate Body members end.37
When criticized over the summer for its lack of engagement to date in ﬁnding a workable
solution, the United States submitted:
[W]e have made clear our willingness to discuss these concerns further with any Member
in order to deepen each other’s understanding of these substantive issues. . . .
...
Unfortunately, one, or perhaps a few, WTO Members have indicated they do not share
the concerns of the United States that the Appellate Body has deviated from the DSU
text. These Members have not, however, adequately or persuasively explained how they
could read the plain DSU text differently. . . .
So the United States continues, as it has always done, to be engaged on these important
substantive issues, including by meeting regularly with the Facilitator and Members to
exchange views on the issues under discussion.
. . . In other words, Members need to engage in a deeper discussion of why the Appellate
Body has felt free to depart from what Members agreed to.
Engagement is a two-way street. Without further engagement from WTO Members on
the cause of the problem, there is no reason to believe that simply adopting new or additional language, in whatever form, will be effective in addressing the concerns that the
United States and other Members have raised.38
that concern issues that are clearly deﬁned by both parties.” DSU, supra note 1, Art. 25(1). But “resort to arbitration shall be subject to mutual agreement of the parties” making it an unequal replacement to the WTO’s current dispute settlement mechanism. Id. Art. 25(2); Hillman, supra note 34, at 9.
35
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Petersmann on “How Should WTO Members Respond to the WTO Appellate Body
Crisis?,” INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), at https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/12/
ulli-petersmann-on-how-should-wto-members-respond-to-the-wto-appellate-body-crisis.html.
36
See Simon Lester, What Does the U.S. Want to See Happen with Appellate Body Reform?, INT’L ECON. L. &
POL’Y BLOG (July 23, 2019), at https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/07/what-does-the-us-want-to-happen-withappellate-body-reform.html (questioning whether the United States is hoping for the Appellate Body to change its
behavior on its own or for the DSB to pass amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding which would
force the Appellate Body to change).
37
Trump’s 2019 Trade Agenda was unenlightening. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2019 TRADE
POLICY AGENDA AND 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM, at 149 (2019), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2019_Trade_Policy_
Agenda_and_2018_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT4N-BS4Y] (“The United States will continue to
raise its systemic concerns with Appellate Body overreaching and press for WTO Members to take responsibility
to ensure the WTO dispute settlement system operates as intended and agreed in the DSU. . . . Participants will
continue to consider reform proposals in 2019.”).
38
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 30–31 (July 22,
2019), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Jul22.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.ﬁn_.
public.pdf [https://perma.cc/28GE-PJSC] (formatting omitted). Some member states have agreed with certain
U.S. positions regarding the Appellate Body. For example, China agreed with the United States that “the
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The fate of the WTO Appellate Body adds more uncertainty to the brewing global trade
developments under Trump’s administration. Trade negotiations have continued between
the United States and China and appeared to make progress in late July of 2019 when
China agreed to increase purchases of U.S. agricultural exports.39 But then, in early
August, Trump tweeted that the United States will “put[] a small additional Tariff of 10%
on the remaining 300 Billion Dollars of goods and products coming from China into our
Country” in addition to the “250 Billion Dollars already Tariffed at 25%,” which would
go into effect on September 1 or December 15, depending on the article.40 When China retaliated by placing tariffs on $75 billion of U.S. products, Trump tweeted again later that month
that “[s]tarting on October 1st, the 250 BILLION DOLLARS of goods and products from
China, currently being taxed at 25%, will be taxed at 30%,” and that the products “being
taxed from September 1st at 10% will now be taxed at 15%.”41 With respect to trade relations
across the Atlantic, Trump recently announced that the United States signed an agreement
with the European Union “mak[ing] it easier to export American beef,” with the goal that
duty-free American beef exports would increase by ninety percent over the next seven
years.42 In statements to reporters, however, Trump described the beef agreement as only
breaking the “ﬁrst barrier” and that “[a]uto tariffs are never off the table.”43 Adding to
the force of Trump’s statements, earlier this year the U.S. Court of International Trade
assessed the legality of Trump’s 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs and held that Congress

Appellate Body should only address the issues appealed by the parties to the dispute and refrain from making ﬁndings on the issues that neither party appealed but said concerns about this should not be used to block the launch of
the Appellate Body selection process.” World Trade Organization Press Release, Panels Established to Examine
Pakistani Duties on Film, Korean Duties on Steel (Oct. 29, 2018), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news18_e/dsb_29oct18_e.htm. More broadly, member states have expressed “their willingness to discuss the
US concerns” with the condition that “the resolution of those concerns [] not be linked to the launching of
the selection process.” World Trade Organization Press Release, Qatar Seeks WTO Panel Review of UAE
Measures on Goods, Services, IP Rights (Oct. 23, 2017), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/
dsb_23oct17_e.htm.
39
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (July 31, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-71 [https://perma.cc/5CFC-SMFE].
40
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2019, 10:26 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1156979446877962243 [https://perma.cc/3CS4-M6EY]. Trump’s tweet had
announced that all goods would have an additional 10% tariff starting on September 1, 2019, id.; however,
the U.S. Trade Representative recently announced that the additional tariff would be delayed for certain articles
such as “cell phones, laptop computers, video game consoles . . . .” U.S. Trade Representative Press Release, USTR
Announces Next Steps on Proposed 10 Percent Tariff on Imports from China (Aug. 13, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2019/august/ustr-announces-next-steps-proposed# [https://
perma.cc/KC82-4Y5M]. For a longer discussion about the tariffs already imposed on China, see Jean
Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 751, 751–53 (2018).
41
Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2019, 2:00 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1165005929831702529 [https://perma.cc/R9BF-ZYAU]; Alan Rappeport & Keith
Bradsher, Trump Says He Will Raise Existing Tariffs on Chinese Goods to 30%, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), at
https://nyti.ms/30oNQEV. Trump later announced that these tariffs would be delayed by several weeks, amid
the continuation of trade negotiations between the United States and China. Ana Swanson, Trump Delays
Planned Tariff Increase in “Gesture of Good Will” to China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/09/11/us/politics/trump-counterfeit-drugs-china.html.
42
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Signing of a European Union-United States Trade Agreement, 2019
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 532, at 1 (Aug. 2).
43
Donald J. Trump, Remarks in an Exchange with Reporters Prior to Departure for Bedminster, New Jersey,
2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 533, at 7 (Aug. 2).
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does have the constitutional authority to delegate such tariff-imposing responsibilities to the
president.44

INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
United States Resists Efforts to Have the Arctic Council Make Climate-Related Statement
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.60

The Arctic Council convened for the eleventh time in early May 2019 in Rovaniemi,
Finland, for a two-day conference. On May 7, the Arctic Council released a Joint
Ministerial Statement that afﬁrmed the desire of the eight member states to work together
to face upcoming challenges but made no substantive commitments and no mention
of climate change. In remarks to the Council, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed
wariness about collective decision making and warned against potential effects of Chinese
activity in the Arctic.
In its ﬁnal statement, the Arctic Council focused on the member states’ commitment to
each other rather than on speciﬁc policies:
Reafﬁrming our commitment to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation
in the Arctic,
Emphasizing the role of Arctic States in providing leadership in addressing new opportunities and challenges in the Arctic, working in close cooperation with the Permanent
Participants,
Recognizing the diversity of the societies, cultures and economies in the Arctic, reafﬁrming our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, to sustainable
development and to the protection of the Arctic environment,
....
[We] [w]elcome the ongoing strategic work, and instruct the Senior Arctic Ofﬁcials to
continue strategic planning, in order to provide guidance and improve the efﬁciency and
effectiveness of the Arctic Council, further instruct the SAOs to review the roles of the
Ministerial meetings, the Senior Arctic Ofﬁcials and the Permanent Participants, and to
report to Ministers in 2021 . . . .1
Notably missing from the ﬁnal statement were any substantive decisions and any mention
of climate change.2 The Arctic Council Chair, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo
44
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). For legal analysis
of this issue, see Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The Legal Authority Behind Trump’s New Tariffs on
Mexico, LAWFARE (June 3, 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-trumps-new-tariffsmexico.
1
Arctic Council Press Release, Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement (May 7, 2019), available at https://
oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2342/Rovaniemi%20Joint%20Ministerial%
20Statement_2019_Signed.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
2
Id.
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Soini, provided additional information through a separate statement, indicating that climate
change was a concern of a majority of members:
A majority of us noted with concern the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change] Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C and its ﬁndings, and
emphasized the importance of mitigation and adaptation actions to limit the impacts
of climate change on Arctic communities as well as on Arctic cryosphere and
ecosystems,
The meeting welcomed the Arctic Climate Change Update 2019 report, and a majority of us underlined that changes in Arctic ecosystems have serious consequences for
people who rely on and beneﬁt from them, and called on the Arctic Council to continue monitoring and assessing changes taking place in the Arctic, in collaboration
with relevant international organizations . . . .3
Media reports indicated that the United States objected to any mention by the Council of
either climate change or the Paris Agreement, to the frustration of other Council members.4
In his remarks to the Council, Pompeo signaled some skepticism about collective agreements
but asserted American environmental leadership:
This forum that we’re in today embodies many of the characteristics that we’d all like to
see in multilateral forum all around the world; it’s built on the bedrock principles of individual sovereignty, voluntary cooperation, and shared responsibility . . . .
...
In addition to sharing our vision, I also came here to listen. I’ve appreciated this
opportunity today to hear from each of you, including on topics that we don’t always
agree on. Even on those topics, I think it is the case that we tend to agree much more
than we disagree. For example, the Trump administration shares your deep commitment to environmental stewardship. In fact, it’s one reason Chinese activity, which
has caused environmental destruction in other regions, continues to concern us in the
Arctic. . . .
Collective goals, even when well-intentioned, are not always the answer. They’re rendered meaningless, even counterproductive, as soon as one nation fails to comply.
Regardless of whether our goal is in place, the United States strives to operate with
honesty and transparency. Though we are not signing on to the collective goal for
reduction of black carbon, America nonetheless recently reported the largest
3

Arctic Council Press Release, Statement by the Chair, at 1, available at https://arctic-council.org/images/
PDF_attachments/Rovaniemi-Statement-from-the-chair_FINAL_840AM-7MAY.pdf.
4
See Anne Gearan, Carol Morello & John Hudson, Trump Administration Pushed to Strip Mention of Climate
Change from Arctic Policy Statement, WASH. POST (May 2, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-administration-pushed-to-strip-mention-of-climate-change-from-arctic-policy-statement/2019/05/02/
1dabcd5e-6c4a-11e9-8f44-e8d8bb1df986_story.html (quoting a source as stating that ‘“There have been challenges in the negotiations with the United States’”); Somini Sengupta, United States Rattles Arctic Talks with a
Sharp Warning to China and Russia, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html (quoting a source as remarking that ‘“There’s seven countries on one
side, and the U.S. on the other’”).
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reduction in black carbon emissions by any Arctic Council state. We are doing our
part, and we encourage other states to do the same, and to do so with full transparency. That’s true for every issue before this council . . . .5
The day before the ofﬁcial Arctic Council ministerial meeting, Pompeo delivered a separate
address in which he argued that the Arctic Council could no longer afford to focus exclusively
on cultural and scientiﬁc issues and indicated that it should also consider strategic ones.6 In
the same speech, Pompeo raised security concerns relating to China and Russia, arguing that
“China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence” and that Russia’s attempts to control the passage through the Northern Sea Route
were “part of a pattern of aggressive Russian behavior . . . in the Arctic.”7 China’s Special
Representative for Arctic Affairs responded that Pompeo’s accusations were groundless and
would not affect China’s involvement in the Arctic.8 In his ofﬁcial remarks at the council
meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated, “there are absolutely no pretexts
for conﬂicts or attempts to address any issues arising here with a military response.”9

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
Trump Administration Takes Domestic and International Measures to Restrict Asylum
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.61

The Trump administration has continued its efforts to restrict immigration through a series
of measures designed to limit the availability of asylum in the United States and to promote
increased immigration enforcement in Mexico. In July of 2019, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated an interim ﬁnal rule disqualifying asylum applicants who transited through third countries without seeking protection
in those countries. This rule immediately became the subject of ongoing litigation, and, in
September of 2019, the Supreme Court stayed an injunction that had been issued against
its enforcement, with two justices dissenting. At the international level, over the summer
5
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (May 7, 2019), at
https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-2 [https://perma.cc/VRS8-N5ZU].
6
Secretary of State Pompeo Remarks on U.S.-Arctic Policy, C-SPAN, at 3:20 (May 6, 2019), at https://www.c-span.
org/video/?460478-1/secretary-state-pompeo-warns-russia-china-arctic-policy-address-ﬁnland.
7
Id. at 8:40, 10:56.
8
Ming Mei, Chinese Representative Refutes Unwarranted U.S. Accusation on Arctic Cooperation, XINHUA (May 7,
2019), at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/07/c_138040973.htm. China has observer status at the
Arctic Council. See Arctic Council, Observers, at https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers.
9
Arctic Council Press Release, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks at the 11th Arctic Council Ministerial
Meeting, Rovaniemi, at 1 (May 7, 2019), at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/
2405/2019_Rovaniemi_Ministerial_Statement_by_the_Russian_Federation_English.pdf?sequence¼5&is
Allowed¼y.
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and early fall of 2019, threats of economic sanctions led Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Mexico to make agreements with the United States aimed at curbing unauthorized migration into the United States. Guatemala signed an agreement with the United States under
which asylum applicants in the United States who had transited through Guatemala on the
way could be returned to Guatemala to pursue their asylum claims. El Salvador and Honduras
also reached agreements with the United States relating to migration. Mexico committed to
increasing its efforts to stem the ﬂow of unauthorized immigration through its borders and
assented to the U.S. expansion of its Migrant Protection Protocols. The Trump administration
has continued pursuing other tactics to limit immigration and the availability of asylum,
including through the issuance of legal decisions by Attorney General William Barr and continued litigation surrounding the construction of a border wall.
Throughout his presidency, Trump has implemented policies designed to reduce immigration to the United States.1 In the past year, the Trump administration has intensiﬁed efforts
to curb migration across the southern border by severely restricting the ability of individuals
to seek asylum in the United States.2 On November 9, 2018, Trump announced his intention to limit access to asylum to those who entered the United States at an ofﬁcial port of
entry,3 and DHS and DOJ promulgated an interim ﬁnal rule to this effect.4 Litigation contesting the rule was swift, and a preliminary injunction against its enforcement was granted on
December 19, 2018.5
On July 16, 2019, DHS and DOJ published an interim ﬁnal rule that would further limit
the availability of asylum. Under this rule, individuals who transited through third countries
and did not apply for asylum in those countries would be ineligible to apply for asylum in the
United States.6 The rule states:
1

For additional background, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 377
(2019) [hereinafter Asylum Story]; Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 741
(2018).
2
See Asylum Story, supra note 1. On April 29, 2019, Trump cited asylum fraud as “the biggest loophole drawing illegal aliens to our borders” and issued a presidential proclamation calling on ofﬁcials to “strengthen asylum
procedures” by promulgating regulations to restructure court proceedings for asylum seekers, institute fees to apply
for asylum or request work authorization, and “reprioritize the assignment of immigration ofﬁcers.” White House
Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump Is Working to Stop the Abuse of Our Asylum System and Address the
Root Causes of the Border Crisis (Apr. 29, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/presidentdonald-j-trump-working-stop-abuse-asylum-system-address-root-causes-border-crisis [https://perma.cc/T72GGCRS]; Donald J. Trump, Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures To Enhance Border Security
and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 251 (Apr. 29).
3
Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 9, 2018).
4
Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims,
83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018).
5
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2018). For additional
information, including a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision not to stay the injunction, see Asylum
Story, supra note 1, at 382–83. Trump extended the November 9 proclamation, which was set to expire ninety
days after its issuance, through two additional proclamations issued on February 7, 2019, and May 8, 2019. In
each of these additional proclamations, Trump dismissed the preliminary injunction as “hamper[ing]” “the ability
of the United States to address these problems” of migration through the southern border and indicated that “[t]he
United States is appealing that injunction.” Proclamation No. 9842, 84 Fed. Reg. 3,665 (Feb. 7, 2019) (extending
the November 9 proclamation for another ninety days); Proclamation No. 9880, 84 Fed. Reg. 21,229 (May 8,
2019) (extending the November 9 proclamation until ninety days after either (1) “the United States obtains relief
from all injunctions that prevent full implementation of the interim ﬁnal rule promulgated” on November 9, or (2)
the United States enters into a safe third country agreement with Mexico).
6
Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modiﬁcations, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019).
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[A]n alien who enters or attempts to enter the United States across the southern border
after failing to apply for protection in a third country outside the alien’s country
of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence through which the alien
transited en route to the United States is ineligible for asylum.7
Although the rule would serve to deny access to asylum to migrants who had transited
through and not sought protection in any third country, it did not purport to disqualify
such individuals from seeking withholding of removal or relief under the Convention against
Torture (CAT).8
The 1951 Refugee Convention does not require an asylum seeker to apply for protection in
the ﬁrst country transited, but rather allows a covered individual to be considered a refugee
unless that person has “acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of
his new nationality” or “is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he
has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of
the nationality of that country.”9 The Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) expressed “deep[] concern[]” about the interim ﬁnal rule and its compliance with international law:
UNHCR believes the rule excessively curtails the right to apply for asylum, jeopar-

dizes the right to protection from refoulement, signiﬁcantly raises the burden of
proof on asylum seekers beyond the international legal standard, sharply curtails
basic rights and freedoms of those who manage to meet it, and is not in line
with international obligations.
...
People have been leaving parts of Central America in growing numbers in recent
years for reasons ranging from extreme economic deprivation to persecution.

7

Id. at 33,830.
Id. Under U.S. immigration laws, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT carry with them
different requirements and burdens of proof and provide the successful applicant with different beneﬁts. See,
e.g., Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]sylum and withholding of removal have
different quantitative standards of proof [that the applicant, if returned will suffer persecution based on a protected
ground]—ten percent for asylum, and ‘more likely than not’ for withholding”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (requiring a showing under [CAT] that it is more likely than not that the applicant will be tortured if returned to his or her
home country). Asylum is a discretionary beneﬁt, while it is mandatory for a judge to grant withholding of removal
or CAT if an applicant meets the requirements. See, e.g., Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir.
2008) (“Although a grant of asylum is in the discretion of the Attorney General, [withholding of removal] is
granted to qualiﬁed aliens as a matter of right . . . [and] [r]elief under the CAT is mandatory if the convention’s
criteria are satisﬁed”) (internal citations omitted). Relief under withholding of removal and CAT do not carry the
same beneﬁts as asylum—a successful applicant does not have a path to becoming a lawful permanent resident
under withholding of removal or CAT as he or she would under asylum. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Fact Sheet, Asylum
and Withholding of Removal Relief Convention Against Torture Protections, at 1, 6–7 (Jan. 15, 2009), available
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EM68-4S4S].
9
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention] (also identifying several other situations in which the person will no longer be considered
a refugee). The United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention but has accepted its obligations by acceding
to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606 UNTS 267.
8
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Many of them are ﬂeeing horriﬁc violence by brutal gangs and are in need of international protection.10
The interim ﬁnal rule faced immediate court challenge. In a complaint ﬁled in the Northern
District of California, the plaintiffs argued, among other things, that this rule was inconsistent
with existing asylum laws and did not comport with international legal obligations.11 The U.S.
statutory provisions governing asylum state that non-citizens present in the United States “may
apply for asylum” subject to speciﬁed exceptions.12 These exceptions include two that are
related to third countries, but neither of these is invoked by the interim ﬁnal rule. One exception is if the individual has been “ﬁrmly resettled in another country prior to arriving to the
United States”13 and the other is if he or she may be removed pursuant to a safe third country
agreement.14 The ﬁrm resettlement bar has consistently been interpreted to require an offer or
receipt of permanent status or citizenship in a third country and thereby cannot be satisﬁed
solely by transit through another country.15 The third safe country provision permits
removal where the United States has entered into an agreement with a country, other
than the one of which the individual in question is a citizen, which permits removal to that
country.16 In addition to the case in the Northern District of California, plaintiffs also brought
a case challenging the interim ﬁnal rule in the District of Columbia.17
On July 24, opposing rulings were issued by federal district courts in the two cases. While
District of Columbia Judge Timothy Kelly issued a decision that would have allowed the interim
rule to take effect,18 Northern District of California Judge Jon Tigar granted a preliminary nationwide injunction enjoining enforcement of the rule.19 Judge Tigar concluded that an injunction
was appropriate because the rule likely conﬂicted with existing asylum laws, violated the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and was arbitrary and capricious.20
10
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Press Release, UNHCR Deeply Concerned about New U.S.
Asylum Restrictions (July 15, 2019), at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d2cdf114/unhcr-deeplyconcerned-new-asylum-restrictions.html.
11
Pl.’s Memo. in Supp. of Mot. for T.R.O. at 3, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 930
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-cv-04073) (“Critically, as part of our nation’s commitment to the protection of people
ﬂeeing persecution and consistent with our international obligations, it is longstanding federal law that merely
transiting through a third country is not a basis to categorically deny asylum to refugees who arrive in the
United States.”).
12
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
13
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
14
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) [hereinafter Safe Third Country Provision].
15
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. For an in-depth explanation of the ﬁrm resettlement bar, see USCIS,
Firm Resettlement Training Module (Jan. 17, 2019), available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/
native
documents/Firm_Resettlement_LP_RAIO.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XNJ-6P89].
16
Safe Third Country Provision, supra note 14; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(E) (stating that this provision
does not apply to unaccompanied minors). Additional qualiﬁcations to the Safe Third Country Provision are discussed in note 32 infra and accompanying text.
17
See Adina Appelbaum, CAIR Coalition Joins in Challenge of New Rule Barring Asylum Eligibility for Many
Migrants, CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. COAL. (July 16, 2019), at https://www.caircoalition.org/news-clip/
cair-coalition-joins-challenge-new-rule-barring-asylum-eligibility-many-migrants.
18
Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. Trump, No. 1:19-CV-02117-TJK, 2019 WL 3436501 (D.D.C.
July 24, 2019).
19
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
20
Id. at 922–23; see also id. at 924 (expressing additional concerns about the application of the rule to unaccompanied minors).

2019

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

837

The Trump administration responded to the rulings in turn, ﬁrst with praise,21 and then with
criticism,22 ultimately vowing with respect to the second decision that it would “pursue all available options to address this meritless ruling and to defend this Nation’s borders.”23 On August
16, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling allowing the interim ﬁnal rule to go into effect outside of the
Ninth Circuit while litigation continues, but denying the government’s motion for a stay with
respect to asylum applicants within the Ninth Circuit.24 On August 26, the Trump administration requested that the Supreme Court stay the preliminary injunction in order to permit the
interim ﬁnal rule to also go into effect within the Ninth Circuit while the litigation continues.25
On September 11, the Supreme Court granted the government’s motion and stayed the lower
court injunction “pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari,
if such a writ is sought.”26 Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg. She stated:
Given the [Northern District of California’s] thorough analysis, and the serious questions
that court raised, I do not believe the Government has carried its “especially heavy” burden [for obtaining a stay]. . . . The rule here may be, as the District Court concluded, in
signiﬁcant tension with the asylum statute. It may also be arbitrary and capricious for
failing to engage with the record evidence contradicting its conclusions. It is especially
concerning, moreover, that the rule the Government promulgated topples decades of settled asylum practices and affects some of the most vulnerable people in the Western
Hemisphere–without affording the public a chance to weigh in.27
The Trump administration issued the July rule at a time when it was negotiating an agreement with Guatemala concerning Guatemala’s designation as a safe third country for asylum
seekers.28 Although negotiations had appeared to break down as Guatemala’s constitutional
court declared that the president was unable to enter into a safe third country agreement
21
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (July 24, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-68 [https://perma.cc/8Y4L-4AVS] (“Today’s ruling in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia is a victory for Americans concerned about the crisis
at our southern border. The court properly rejected the attempt of a few special interest groups to block a rule that
discourages abuse of our asylum system.”).
22
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (July 25, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-69 [https://perma.cc/MM6B-AD52] (“Yesterday evening, a
single district judge in California, based on a complaint ﬁled by a few activist groups with no legal standing, issued
a nationwide injunction against a lawful and necessary rule that discourages abuse of our asylum system—and did
so despite a ruling from another Federal judge earlier in the day rejecting the same request by other plaintiffs and
suggesting that the Government was likely to prevail against challenges to the rule.”).
23
Id.
24
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, No. 19-16487, 2019 WL 3850928 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019).
25
Application for a Stay Pending Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
Pending Further Proceedings in This Court, Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, S. Ct. No. 19A230 (Aug. 26,
2019), at https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?ﬁlename=/docket/docketﬁles/html/public/19a230.html.
26
Decision on Application for Stay at 1, Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, S. Ct. No. 19A230 (Sept. 11,
2019), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/19a230_k53l.pdf. The order itself did not
contain any substantive legal reasoning. See id.
27
Id. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor’s dissent also detailed several further proceedings in the
lower courts that occurred between the August 16 decision of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court’s order.
See id. at 4-5.
28
Marcia Brown, Trump’s Latest Asylum Rule, Explained, AM. PROSPECT (July 22, 2019), at https://prospect.org/
article/trumps-latest-asylum-rule-explained.
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without legislative consent,29 the two countries abruptly signed an agreement on July 2630
amidst threats from Trump of tariffs and other retaliatory measures.31 When asked how the
agreement would function, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan
explained:
So this is a return to the appropriate approach with—under international law to protecting asylum seekers at the earliest possible point in their journey. If you have a
Honduran family or an El Salvadorian national, instead of having them pay a smuggler,
come all the way to our border to seek asylum, when they arrive in Guatemala, they’re
in a country that has a fair proceeding for assessing asylum claims, and that’s where they
should make that claim. That returns that understanding under international law.
They can make a protection claim, if they would like, in Guatemala. So if they arrive in
the U.S. not having availed themselves of that opportunity, they’ll be returned to
Guatemala.32
Despite the Trump administration’s statements, critics have decried the agreement as an
inadequate protection of migrants’ rights.33 U.S. asylum law requires that removal pursuant
to a safe third country agreement can occur only when, in the determination of the attorney
general, it will not threaten the life or freedom of the individual removed “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” but will
provide “access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent
temporary protection.”34 UNHCR has similarly concluded that “in keeping with relevant
international law standards” the safe third country should be one which will “grant the person
access to a fair and efﬁcient procedure for determination of refugee status and other international protection needs” and “accord the person standards of treatment commensurate with
29

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Noticias de Interés (July 23, 2019), at https://www.minex.gob.gt/noticias/Noticia.aspx?id¼28309. See also Marcia Brown, As a Guatemala Asylum Agreement Fades, a New Trump Rule
Threatens Migrants, AM. PROSPECT (July 15, 2019), at https://prospect.org/article/guatemala-asylum-agreementfades-new-trump-rule-threatens-migrants.
30
The White House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER (July 26, 2019, 2:10 PM), at https://twitter.com/whitehouse/
status/1154861528539160576 [https://perma.cc/D62L-VRDV]. Guatemala may not view the agreement as
amounting to a safe third country agreement. See Lauren Carasik, Trump’s Safe Third Country Agreement with
Guatemala Is a Lie, FOR. POL’Y (July 30, 2019), at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/trumps-safe-third-country-agreement-with-guatemala-is-a-lie (“For his part, [the President of Guatemala] has declined to characterize the
accord as a safe third country agreement, calling it a ‘Cooperation Agreement’ instead, apparently to circumvent
the Constitutional Court’s injunction.”). The countries did not ofﬁcially release the contents of this agreement at
ﬁrst, but the text appears to have become available online, including at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/Guatemala-Cooperative-Agreement-with-Signature-Blocks-ENG.pdf.
31
Donald J. Trump, Remarks in an Exchange with Reporters Prior to Departure for Wheeling, West Virginia,
2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 506 (July 24) (“So, Guatemala gave us their word. We were going to sign a safe
third agreement and then, all of a sudden, they backed up. They said it was their supreme court. I don’t believe
that. But they use their supreme court as the reason they didn’t want to do it. So we’ll either do tariffs or we’ll do
something. We’re looking at something very severe with respect to Guatemala . . . . So, Guatemala we’re going to
take care of and it won’t even be tough. We’re going to do—we’re looking at a couple of different things.”).
32
Remarks on the Signing of the Guatemala-United States Safe Third Country Agreement and an Exchange
with Reporters, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 509 (July 26).
33
Michael D. Shear, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Elizabeth Malkin, After Tariff Threat, Trump Says Guatemala
Has Agreed to New Asylum Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/world/
americas/trump-guatemala-asylum.html.
34
Safe Third Country Provision, supra note 14.
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the 1951 [Refugee] Convention and international human rights standards, including—but
not limited to—protection from refoulement.”35 It is far from clear that Guatemala will
meet these standards. The most recent U.S. State Department’s human rights country
report on Guatemala describe it as rife with human rights abuses,36 and the incoming
president of Guatemala, who takes ofﬁce in January of 2020, stated in an interview
that “‘I do not think Guatemala fulﬁlls the requirements to be a third safe country.’”37
Both U.S. and Guatemalan advocates have threatened to go to court if this agreement
takes effect.38
On September 20, 2019, the Trump administration announced that the United States had
reached an agreement with El Salvador whose “signing reﬂects the partnership and commitment between both nations to discourage dangerous irregular migration across Central
America towards the U.S. and to combat transnational criminal organizations, strengthen
border security, and reduce human trafﬁcking and smuggling.”39 A similar agreement was
reached with Honduras on September 25, and reporting indicates that both agreements
have much in common with the Guatemala agreement.40
In addition to taking measures designed to limit the availability of asylum in the United
States, the Trump administration has ratcheted up pressure on Mexico to increase enforcement
of its own immigration laws and inhibit migrants’ progress toward the United States. On May
30, Trump issued a statement condemning Mexico’s “passive cooperation” in “allowing th[e]
mass incursion” of unauthorized immigrants into the United States.41 He cited the “severe and
dangerous consequences of illegal immigration” that Mexico has “allowed . . . to go on for many
years” and called on Mexico to “step up and help solve this problem.”42 Trump threatened devastating economic consequences if Mexico failed to act:
35
UNHCR, Legal Considerations Regarding Access to Protection and a Connection Between the Refugee and
the Third Country in the Context of Return or Transfer to Safe Third Countries (Apr. 2018), available at https://
www.refworld.org/docid/5acb33ad4.html. For further discussion of the principle of non-refoulement, see Asylum
Story, supra note 1.
36
U.S. Dep’t of State, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala (Mar. 13, 2019), at
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala (stating that
“Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces”; that “[h]uman rights
issues included reports of harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; widespread corruption; trafﬁcking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats thereof targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
(LGBTI) persons, persons with disabilities, and members of other minority groups; and use of forced or compulsory or child labor”; and that “[c]orruption and inadequate investigations made prosecution difﬁcult, and impunity continued to be widespread”).
37
Sonia Perez D., President-Elect Says Guatemala Can’t Do Migrant Deal with US, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 13,
2019), at https://www.apnews.com/ecd51531cbf2428c823ab06233c222a9 (also stating that the agreement
would need the approval of the Guatemalan legislature).
38
Kirk Semple, The U.S. and Guatemala Reached an Asylum Deal: Here’s What It Means, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/world/americas/guatemala-safe-third-asylum.html.
39
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Press Release, Joint Statement Between the U.S. Government and the
Government of El Salvador (Sept. 20, 2019), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/09/20/joint-statementbetween-us-government-and-government-el-salvador.
40
Nick Miroff, U.S. Announces Asylum Deal with Honduras, Could Send Migrants to One of World's Most Violent
Nations, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-announces-asylumdeal-with-honduras-could-send-migrants-to-one-of-worlds-most-violent-nations/2019/09/25/cca94a86-dfb611e9-8fd3-d943b4ed57e0_story.html.
41
Donald J. Trump, Statement on Emergency Measures to Address Illegal Migration at the Mexico-United
States Border, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 354 (May 30).
42
Id.
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[S]tarting on June 10, 2019, the United States will impose a 5 percent Tariff on all goods
imported from Mexico. If the illegal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions
taken by Mexico, to be determined in our sole discretion and judgment, the Tariffs will be
removed. If the crisis persists, however, the Tariffs will be raised to 10 percent on July 1,
2019. Similarly, if Mexico still has not taken action to dramatically reduce or eliminate the
number of illegal aliens crossing its territory into the United States, Tariffs will be
increased to 15 percent on August 1, 2019, to 20 percent on September 1, 2019, and
to 25 percent on October 1, 2019. Tariffs will permanently remain at the 25 percent
level unless and until Mexico substantially stops the illegal inﬂow of aliens coming through
its territory.43
Shortly thereafter, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement and Trump indicated that “[t]he Tariffs scheduled to be implemented by the U.S. . . . against Mexico, are
hereby indeﬁnitely suspended.”44 The United States and Mexico signed a joint declaration
on June 7 involving “a set of joint obligations” that, in the words of the accompanying U.S.
State Department press release, “beneﬁt both the United States and Mexico” with the goal of
“stem[ming] the tide of illegal migration across our southern border and to make our border
strong and secure.”45 The joint declaration promised that the United States and Mexico
would “work together to immediately implement a durable solution” to “the humanitarian
emergency and security situation” resulting from “the dramatic increase in migrants moving
from Central America through Mexico to the United States.”46 Mexico agreed to “take
unprecedented steps to increase enforcement to curb irregular migration, to include the
deployment of its National Guard throughout Mexico, giving priority to its southern border.”47 Since signing this joint declaration, Mexico has taken certain measures to increase
its enforcement against unauthorized migration.48
The joint declaration also indicated the United States’ intention to “expand the implementation of the existing Migrant Protection Protocols across its entire Southern Border.”49 The
Migrant Protection Protocols are a Trump administration policy under which asylum seekers
arriving in the United States from Mexico await their immigration proceedings in Mexico
rather than in the United States.50 The joint declaration explained: “This means that those
43
Id. For a discussion of the extent to which Trump might have the legal authority to impose these tariffs under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), see Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The
Legal Authority Behind Trump’s New Tariffs on Mexico, LAWFARE BLOG (June 3, 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-trumps-new-tariffs-mexico.
44
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 7, 2019, 8:31 PM), at https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1137155056044826626?lang¼en [https://perma.cc/75XT-V4GX].
45
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Statement, Conclusion of Negotiations with Mexico (June 7, 2019), at https://
www.state.gov/conclusion-of-negotiations-with-mexico [https://perma.cc/3S55-LLTE].
46
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration (June 7, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/us-mexico-joint-declaration/ [https://perma.cc/Q8CA-2JVJ] [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
47
Id.
48
James Fredrick, How Mexico Beefs Up Immigration Enforcement to Meet Trump’s Terms, NPR (July 13, 2019),
at https://www.npr.org/2019/07/13/740009105/how-mexico-beefs-up-immigration-enforcement-to-meettrumps-terms.
49
Joint Declaration, supra note 46.
50
For additional background, see Asylum Story, supra note 1. The Trump administration began implementing
the Migrant Protection Protocols in January of 2019. Although a federal district court judge initially imposed a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Migrant Protection Protocols, the Ninth Circuit granted the

2019

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

841

crossing the U.S. Southern Border to seek asylum will be rapidly returned to Mexico where
they may await the adjudication of their asylum claims.”51
In April and July of 2019, Attorney General Barr issued binding immigration decisions
designed to further deter asylum seekers from coming to the United States and to tighten
the legal standard by which applicants could obtain asylum. On April 16, 2019, Barr issued
a decision determining that all asylum applicants in DHS custody are subject to mandatory
detention pending the adjudication of their claims unless the government allows that applicant to be released on parole—a decision that severely restricts the ability of asylum applicants
to be released from detention.52 On July 2, a federal judge issued an injunction blocking the
enforcement of Barr’s decision, holding that “it is unconstitutional to deny [immigrants
who had entered the United States, requested asylum, and were determined to have a
credible fear of persecution] a bond hearing while they await a ﬁnal determination
of their asylum request.”53 Barr’s other decision, issued on July 29, 2019, changed
the standard by which migrants could obtain asylum for claims involving family
groups.54 Under the Refugee Convention, individuals are eligible for asylum if they express
a well-founded fear of persecution based on a protected ground, including “membership of a
particular social group,”55 and U.S. law has long interpreted an immediate family unit to
compose a cognizable “particular social group.”56 Barr’s ruling narrows this standard, declaring that “an alien’s family-based group will not constitute a particular social group unless it
has been shown to be socially distinct in the eyes of its society, not just those of its alleged
persecutor.”57
In addition to efforts to restrict the availability of asylum and to encourage the United
States’ southern neighbors to play an increasingly active role in stemming unauthorized
migration through the region, the Trump administration has pushed its agenda with respect
government’s motion to stay the injunction and consequently, the program was allowed to take effect as litigation
continues. Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Innovation Law Lab
v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019).
51
Joint Declaration, supra note 46.
52
Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019); see also Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, In New Effort to
Deter Migrants, Barr Withholds Bail to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/16/us/politics/barr-asylum-bail.html. A recent document issued by UNHCR states that “[i]mportantly,
as seeking asylum is not an unlawful act, detaining asylum-seekers for the sole reason of having entered without
prior authorisation runs counter to international law. Under international law, individuals have the right to seek
asylum, and if they do so, to be treated humanely and with dignity.” UNHCR, BEYOND DETENTION 2014–2019: A
GLOBAL STRATEGY TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENTS TO END THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES, at 5, at
https://www.unhcr.org/53aa929f6.
53
Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1223 (W.D. Wash. 2019). The White
House press secretary condemned this decision as “at war with the rule of law.” White House Press Release,
Statement from the Press Secretary (July 3, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-61 [https://perma.cc/TJ68-7HPC].
54
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019).
55
Refugee Convention, supra note 9, Art. 1(A)(2).
56
See, e.g., Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 959 (BIA 2006), overruled on other grounds by Benitez Ramos
v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Social groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.”).
57
27 I&N, supra note 54, at 582. In addition to these developments, the Trump administration is also seeking
to revisit a long-standing court settlement that limits the extent to which minor children entering the United States
can be held in detention. See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face Indeﬁnite
Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/
politics/ﬂores-migrant-family-detention.html (describing a newly issued regulation on this issue).
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to constructing a wall along the southern border. After Congress refused to provide the
desired level of funding to build the wall, Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border on February 15 in order to access additional emergency funds.58 On April 5, the
House of Representatives ﬁled a lawsuit arguing that the Trump administration’s attempts to
circumvent Congress in using funding appropriated for other purposes violated the
Appropriations Clause of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act.59 On
June 3, the House of Representatives’ motion for a preliminary injunction was denied for
lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction.60 A separate challenge to the Trump administration’s border wall was ﬁled in the Northern District of California, leading a federal district
court to grant a permanent injunction on June 28 against construction of portions of the
wall.61 Although the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay of the injunction,62 the Supreme Court overturned this decision and stayed the injunction on July 26.63
The litigation is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit.

Secretary of State Establishes Commission on Unalienable Rights
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.62

On July 8, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo established a Commission on
Unalienable Rights. The Commission will “provide the Secretary of State advice and
recommendations concerning international human rights matters . . . [and] provide fresh
thinking about human rights discourse where such discourse has departed from our nation’s
founding principles of natural law and natural rights.”1 The Commission has an initial
two-year mandate. Democratic lawmakers have raised concerns that the Commission will
circumvent existing structures and challenge LGBTQþ protections and reproductive rights.
In May 2019, Pompeo gave formal notice of his intent to establish a Commission on
Unalienable Rights, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.2 On July 8, he
announced the creation of the Commission.3 The Commission will study the Universal
58

Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,949 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Asylum Story, supra note 1.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2019).
60
Id.
61
Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-CV-00892-HSG, 2019 WL 2715422 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019).
62
Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019).
63
Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 19A60, 2019 WL 3369425 (U.S. July 26, 2019).
1
Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights, 84 Fed. Reg. 25109 (May 30, 2019).
2
Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. App. § 9 (2018) (setting conditions on the establishment of advisory commissions,
including that notice of their establishment be published in the Federal Register).
3
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, Remarks to the Press (July 8, 2019),
at https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-3 [https://perma.cc/V6MZTATP] [hereinafter Pompeo Remarks].
59
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Declaration of Human Rights and Founding-era documents to produce a written guide that,
as Pompeo describes it, “the State Department and every American can stare at and say this is
consistent with American history.”4 The Commission will automatically be dissolved after
two years unless “it is formally determined to be in the public interest to continue it for
another two years.”5
Pompeo emphasized that the Commission is intended to ensure that “human rights discourse not be corrupted or hijacked or used for dubious or malignant purposes,” explaining:
It’s a sad commentary on our times that more than 70 years after the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, gross violations continue throughout the world,
sometimes even in the name of human rights. International institutions designed and
built to protect human rights have drifted from their original mission. As human rights
claims have proliferated, some claims have come into tension with one another,
provoking questions and clashes about which rights are entitled to gain respect. . . .
I hope that the commission will revisit the most basic of questions: What does it mean to
say or claim that something is, in fact, a human right? How do we know or how do we
determine whether that claim that this or that is a human right, is it true, and therefore,
ought it to be honored? How can there be human rights, rights we possess not as privileges we are granted or even earn, but simply by virtue of our humanity belong to us? Is
it, in fact, true, as our Declaration of Independence asserts, that as human beings, we—all
of us, every member of our human family—are endowed by our creator with certain
unalienable rights?6
In a newspaper editorial published around the same time, Pompeo wrote:
[A]fter the Cold War ended, many human-rights advocates turned their energy to new
categories of rights. These rights often sound noble and just. But when politicians and
bureaucrats create new rights, they blur the distinction between unalienable rights and ad
hoc rights granted by governments. Unalienable rights are by nature universal. Not everything good, or everything granted by a government, can be a universal right. Loose talk of
“rights” unmoors us from the principles of liberal democracy. . . . Rights claims are often
aimed more at rewarding interest groups and dividing humanity into subgroups. . . . The
commission’s work could also help reorient international institutions speciﬁcally tasked
to protect human rights, like the United Nations, back to their original missions.7
The Commission currently consists of ten individuals appointed by Pompeo.8 The
Commission’s chair is Mary Ann Glendon, a Harvard Law professor and former ambassador
4

U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Teleconference Interview by Sebastian Gorka with Michael R. Pompeo,
Secretary of State (July 12, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/interview-with-sebastian-gorka-of-america-ﬁrst
[https://perma.cc/59FL-TYXM].
5
U.S. Dep’t of State, Commission on Unalienable Rights Charter, at 3 (2019), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/charter-commission-unalienable-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/T873TLQR].
6
Pompeo Remarks, supra note 3.
7
Michael R. Pompeo, Unalienable Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, WALL STREET J. (July 7, 2019), at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unalienable-rights-and-u-s-foreign-policy-11562526448.
8
Pompeo Remarks, supra note 3.
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to the Vatican.9 Glendon stated that, under her leadership, the Commission will focus on
“principle[s], not polic[ies],” drawn from the “distinctive rights tradition of the United
States of America.”10
The Commission’s creation dismayed a substantial number of Democratic members of
Congress, who described its premises as an “Orwellian twist to defend the indefensible”11
and characterized it as an “attempt to make an end run around career experts, statutorily
established State Department structures, and widely accepted interpretations of human rights
law to push a narrow, discriminatory agenda that decides whose rights are worth protecting
and whose rights the Administration will ignore.”12 They also criticized Pompeo for withholding information about the Commission from Congress until the day he publicly
announced the creation of the Commission.13 And they questioned the redundancy of the
Commission in light of the “career, non-partisan human rights experts” at the State
Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and the Ofﬁce of
the Legal Adviser.14 The lawmakers further warned that the Commission could be used to
denigrate LGBTQþ and reproductive rights.15 In addition to vocalizing their objections,
Democratic legislators are seeking to block funding for the Commission through
Congress’s power of the purse.16
9
Harvard Law School, Mary Ann Glendon Faculty Proﬁle, at https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10311/
Glendon [https://perma.cc/4CGK-43HH]; Pompeo Remarks, supra note 3.
10
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Mary Ann Glendon, Chairwoman, Comm’n on Unalienable Rights,
Remarks to the Press (July 8, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-tothe-press-3 [https://perma.cc/V6MZ-TATP].
11
Letter from 23 Democratic U.S. Senators to Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, at 1 (July 23, 2019), available
at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-23-19%20Dems%20letter%20re%20Commission%
20on%20Unalienable%20Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9LH-ZLXP] [hereinafter Senate Letter].
12
Letter from 50 Democratic U.S. Representatives to Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, at 1 (July 18, 2019),
available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/ﬁles/2/9/294cc9ed-3391-4fa2-968a-424f8e687dac/
6B92FE10FE738FAEB3A6FB2BB7E69BC9.doc139.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XHZ-QY28] [hereinafter House
Letter]. Separately, a coalition of 178 organizations and various individuals (including some prominent ﬁgures
from the Obama administration) signed a public letter urging that the Commission be disbanded because it promoted a “hierarchy of rights,” reminiscent of those commonly found in autocratic governments. See generally
Letter from Coal. Opposing the Comm’n on Unalienable Rights to Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State (July
23, 2019), available at https://www.humanrightsﬁrst.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Unalienable-Rights-CommissionNGO-Ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z77-5TWR]. By contrast, the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom, an independent commission lodged in the State Department, praised the creation of the
Commission on Unalienable Rights as a “way of ensuring that the protection of these fundamental rights—the
most foundational of which is freedom of religion or belief—is a core element of strategic policy discussions.” U.S.
Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom Press Release, USCIRF Statement on State Department’s Creation of
“Commission on Unalienable Rights” (July 8, 2019), at https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases-statements/uscirf-statement-state-department-s-creation-commission [https://perma.cc/3N63-K6AT].
13
House Letter, supra note 12, at 2; accord Senate Letter, supra note 11, at 1.
14
House Letter, supra note 12, at 1.
15
Senate Letter, supra note 11, at 2. But see Carol Morello, State Department Launches Panel Focused on Human
Rights and Natural Law, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019) (quoting an unnamed State Department ofﬁcial as stating that
the Commission “will not make any pronouncements on gay marriage and abortion”).
16
An appropriations bill passed by the House of Representatives for the State Department’s next ﬁscal year
would ban the use of its funds for the Commission. Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Defense,
State, Foreign Operations, and Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2020, H.R. 2740, 116th
Cong. § 7070 (2019). As of late September 2019, this bill remained pending in the Senate. All Actions H.R.
2740 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV, at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/2740/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+2740%22%5D%7D&s=7&r=1 [https://
perma.cc/5W44-Q8TZ].
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USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
Trump Administration’s Iran Policies Raise Questions About the Executive’s Authority to Use
Force Against Iran
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.63

In the face of rising tensions between Iran and the United States, some members of
Congress have urged the Trump administration to clarify whether it believes it has congressional authorization to use force against Iran.1 In June of 2019, the U.S. State Department
issued a letter stating that it had not “to date” interpreted either the 2001 or the 2002
Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF, respectively) “as
authorizing military force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner
forces engaged in counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable, democratic
Iraq.”2
In May of 2019, the Trump administration sent an air carrier strike force and a bomber
strike force to the Middle East “to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian
regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with
unrelenting force.”3 On June 17, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan authorized
the deployment of 1,000 additional troops to the Middle East in response to “the reliable,
credible intelligence we have received on hostile behavior by Iranian forces and their proxy
groups . . . .”4 After the troop deployment, a bipartisan group of six senators sent a letter to
President Trump inquiring about the relationship of the deployed troops’ mission to Iran:
1
See Letter from Eliot Engel, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign Aff. and Ted Deutch, Chairman,
H. Subcomm. on the Middle East, North Africa, and Int’l Terrorism, to Marik String, Acting Legal Adviser,
U.S. Dep’t of State (June 25, 2019), available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/ﬁles/6/f/6f43caff89cd-4a7f-bfe7-841db9f5d305/3D06F9947687C18E9BB46C8A50603AEB.ele-deutch-letter-to-string-aumfiran.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWH7-M9XB] [hereinafter House Letter]; Letter from Michael S. Lee, Senator, et.
al., to Donald J. Trump, President (June 18, 2019), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/413785563/
Kaine-Lee-Call-on-President-Trump-to-Explain-New-Deployments-to-the-Middle-East-Warn-Against-WarWith-Iran, [https://perma.cc/67R9-97N3] [hereinafter Senate Letter].
2
Letter from Mary Elizabeth Taylor, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Legis. Aff., to Eliot L. Engel, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Foreign Aff. (June 28, 2019), available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/ﬁles/8/4/
84c1fa85-94cf-43c8-84a1-472972ec9c11/CCDEB9BD152E93A97B89332218E2A89C.aumf.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9YLU-59FL] [hereinafter State Department Letter]; see also Tess Bridgeman & Ryan Goodman,
Unpacking the State Dept Acknowledgement that 2001 and 2002 AUMFs Don’t Authorize War Against Iran,
JUST SECURITY (July 3, 2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/64807/unpacking-the-state-dept-acknowledgment-that-2001-and-2002-aumfs-dont-authorize-war-against-iran. The 2001 AUMF authorizes the president
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons.” Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The 2002 AUMF authorizes the president to use force
to “(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2)
enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” Pub. L. No. 107–243, 116
Stat. 1498 (2002).
3
See White House Press Release, Statement from the National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton (May
5, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-national-security-advisor-ambassadorjohn-bolton-2 [https://perma.cc/N3GP-E7XW].
4
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement from Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan on
Additional Forces to U.S. Central Command (June 17, 2019), at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Releases/Release/Article/1879076/statement-from-acting-secretary-of-defense-patrick-shanahan-on-additionalforce [https://perma.cc/S5SQ-NNYQ].
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Given that growing risk, we want to reiterate that, as of this date, Congress has not authorized war with Iran and no current statutory authority allows the U.S. to conduct hostilities against the Government of Iran. To that end, we expect the administration to seek
authorization prior to any deployment of forces into hostilities or areas where hostilities
with Iran are imminent . . . . Article One, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
provides Congress the exclusive power to declare war. It is critical that Congress fully
retain and enforce this authority.5
Even before this additional deployment, the administration had faced questioning regarding a potential war with Iran. After the designation of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization,6 Senator Rand Paul asked Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo during testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if he
believed that the 2001 AUMF applied to Iran.7 Pompeo replied, “I’d prefer to just leave
that to lawyers.”8 After Paul pressed him for a direct response, Pompeo stated:
The legal question I will leave to counsel. The factual question with respect to Iran’s connections to Al Qaeda is very real. They have hosted Al Qaeda. They have permitted Al
Qaeda to transit their country. There’s no doubt there is a connection between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Al Qaeda. Period, full stop.9
In response, Paul stated, “I can tell you explicitly you have not been given power or authority
by Congress to have war with Iran,” to which Pompeo did not reply.10
At a House Foreign Relations Committee hearing on June 19, Chair Ted Deutch asked the
State Department’s Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook if the administration believed
that Al Qaeda operatives transiting through or living in Iran were sufﬁcient grounds for the
use of force in Iran under the 2001 AUMF.11 Hook reiterated that it was not the policy goal of
the administration to seek a military engagement with Iran but stated, “If the use of military
force is necessary to defend U.S. national security interests, we will do everything that we
are required to do with respect to Congressional war powers and we will comply with the
law.”12 When pushed on the point, Hook referred Deutch to the State Department’s
Ofﬁce of the Legal Adviser.13

5

Senate Letter, supra note 1.
For more about this designation, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL
609 (2019).
7
Review of the FY 2020 State Department Budget Request: Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 116th
Cong., at 1:20:30 (Apr. 10, 2019) (testimony of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo), available at https://www.for
eign.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy-2020-state-department-budget-request-041019. Paul did not ask
Pompeo about authorization under the 2002 AUMF. See id.
8
Id. at 1:21:54.
9
Id. at 1:22:46.
10
Id. at 1:23:08.
11
Oversight of the Trump Administration’s Iran Policy: Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 116th
Cong., at 32:54 (June 19, 2019) (statement of Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼FKK_fABJjl4.
12
Id. at 34:15, 34:34.
13
Id. at 34:55.
6
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The day after Hook’s testimony, Iran downed an unmanned U.S. drone.14 Iran subsequently
submitted a letter to the Security Council of the United Nations reporting the downing of the
U.S. drone and claiming that its actions were justiﬁed under Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations because the drone “engaged in a clear spying operation.”15 Iran asserted that
the drone “entered into the Iranian airspace where the Islamic Republic of Iran . . . targeted
the intruding aircraft . . . .”16 A U.S. press release announcing the incident stated that the
drone was operating over international waters thirty-four kilometers from the Iranian coast
and that “Iranian reports that this aircraft was shot down over Iran are categorically false.”17
On the following day, June 21, Trump announced that he had ordered and then cancelled
retaliatory strikes against Iran because the strikes would not have been “proportionate to
shooting down an unmanned drone.”18 The White House and the Pentagon did not further
discuss these potential strikes on the record.19 While Trump cancelled physical strikes, media
reports indicated that he did authorize certain cyberattacks against Iran.20
On June 25, Deutch, as well as House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel,
submitted a letter to the Acting Legal Adviser for the State Department Marik String requesting “[a]ny and all legal analysis, whether contained in electronic documents, emails, or hard
copy, concerning, relating, or referring in any way to whether the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs are
applicable to any actions that could be undertaken by the Executive Branch in or against the
Islamic Republic of Iran.”21
The response from the State Department on June 28 came not from the Acting Legal
Adviser, but rather from Mary Elizabeth Taylor, the assistant secretary of state for legislative
affairs. She did not produce any documents in response to the request from Deutch and
Engel, but rather stated in her letter:
14
U.S. Cent. Command Statement, U.S. Air Forces Central Command Statement on the Shoot Down of a
U.S. RQ-4, at https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/1882519/us-airforces-central-command-statement-on-the-shoot-down-of-a-us-rq-4 [https://perma.cc/X6FE-NJSV] [hereinafter
Cent. Com. Statement].
15
Letter from Majid Takht Ravanchi, Ambassador of Iran to the UN, to António Guterres, Secretary-Gen. of
the UN (June 20, 2019), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Iran-UNSCLetter-S_2019_512_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FWY-AZHF] [hereinafter Iran Article 51 Letter]. Under Article
51 of the UN Charter “[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of . . . self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council . . . .” UN Charter, Art. 51.
16
Iran Article 51 Letter, supra note 15.
17
Cent. Com. Statement, supra note 14. For discussion of the disagreement between the United States and Iran
with respect both to the location of the drone and to the law of the sea as it relates to control over the Strait of
Hormuz, see Mark Nevitt, The Missing Piece in US-Iran Drone Dispute: Navigational Freedoms and the Strait of
Hormuz, JUST SECURITY (June 28, 2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/64725/the-missing-piece-in-us-irandrone-dispute-navigational-freedoms-and-the-strait-of-hormuz.
18
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 7:03 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1142055392488374272 [https://perma.cc/42JZ-5LEK].
19
See Michael Shear, Eric Schmitt, Michael Crowley & Maggie Haberman, Strikes on Iran Approved by Trump,
Then Abruptly Pulled Back, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html.
20
Ellen Nakashima, Trump Approved Cyber-Strikes Against Iranian Computer Database Used to Plan Attacks on
Oil Tankers, WASH. POST (June 22, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/withtrumps-approval-pentagon-launched-cyber-strikes-against-iran/2019/06/22/250d3740-950d-11e9-b5706416efdc0803_story.html; Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Cyberattack Hurt Iran’s Ability to Target Oil Tankers, Ofﬁcials
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.
html.
21
House Letter, supra note 1.
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The Department of State has great respect for Congress’s role in authorizing the use of
military force. As Secretary Pompeo has noted, the Administration’s goal is to ﬁnd a diplomatic solution to Iran’s activities, not to engage in conﬂict with Iran. Moreover, the
Administration has not, to date, interpreted either AUMF as authorizing military
force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner forces engaged
in counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable, democratic Iraq.
President Trump has expressed the U.S. willingness to negotiate with Iran. No one
should be uncertain about the United States’ desire for peace or a readiness to normalize
relations in the event the United States and Iran reach a comprehensive deal. As Special
Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State Brian Hook
testiﬁed to your Committee on June 19, 2019, the Administration has implemented an
unprecedented maximum pressure campaign focused on Iran with two primary objectives: ﬁrst, to deprive the Iranian regime of the money it needs to support its destabilizing
activities, and second, to bring Iran back to the negotiating table to conclude a comprehensive and enduring deal as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in May 2018.22
Neither her letter nor the inquiry to which she was responding discussed the conditions under
which the president would have the independent constitutional authority to use force against
Iran if neither the 2001 AUMF nor the 2002 AUMF were applicable.23
On July 18, approximately a month after the downing of the U.S. drone, Trump
announced that the American military had destroyed an Iranian drone located over international waters in the Strait of Hormuz.24 Trump described the act as one of self-defense, asserting that the drone had approached an American vessel and ignored repeated warnings.25
Unlike Iran, the United States does not appear to have submitted an Article 51 letter to
the Security Council describing its action. Iran denied that it had lost any of its drones.26
In addition to the tensions described above, relations between the United States and Iran
worsened on other fronts during the summer of 2019. The Trump administration built upon
the vast set of sanctions it had already imposed on Iran by implementing sanctions designed to
target Iran’s metals industry,27 and by adding sanctions directed at the Ofﬁce of the Supreme
Leader of Iran.28 In early July, meanwhile, Iran exceeded the uranium enrichment limits set
22

State Department Letter, supra note 2.
For a recent, formalized articulation of the position of the Department of Justice’s Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel
relevant to this issue, see April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1
(May 31, 2018) (slip op.) (concluding that the president could order air strikes against Syria under his independent
constitutional authority in response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons against its own citizens); see also Jean
Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 522 (2018).
24
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 18, 2019,1:13 PM), at https://twitter.com/realdo
naldtrump/status/1151948135868051457 [https://perma.cc/3YGD-X3E3].
25
Id.
26
Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi), TWITTER (July 18, 2019, 10:03 PM), at https://twitter.com/araghchi/
status/1152081448704196611 [https://perma.cc/6ME4-UYP4].
27
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, First Anniversary of President Trump’s New Iran Strategy (May 8, 2019),
at https://www.state.gov/ﬁrst-anniversary-of-president-trumps-new-iran-strategy [https://perma.cc/6ZAYH6BG].
28
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Executive Order to Impose Sanctions on the Ofﬁce of the Supreme Leader
of Iran (June 24, 2019), at https://www.state.gov/executive-order-to-impose-sanctions-on-the-ofﬁce-of-thesupreme-leader-of-iran [https://perma.cc/AJ8S-HJA7].
23
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out in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, justifying this action by pointing to the
earlier decision of the United States to withdraw from this commitment and reimpose sanctions.29 Iran has also warned that it could stop all energy exports through the Strait of
Hormuz if sanctions relief is not forthcoming.30 In September of 2019, a drone attack
inﬂicted major damage on Saudi oil production facilities. Iran denied carrying out the strike,
but Pompeo, among others, deemed Iran responsible and warned of consequences.31

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NONSTATE ACTORS
U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Habeas Case Brought by Guantánamo Bay Detainee
Challenging His Continuing Detention
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.64

On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which the D.C. Circuit
held that the United States could continue to detain an individual at Guantánamo Bay until
the cessation of the hostilities that justiﬁed his initial detention, notwithstanding the extraordinary length of the hostilities to date.1 The case, Al-Alwi v. Trump, arises from petitioner
Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality
of his continued detention at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay.2 The
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari was accompanied by a statement by Justice Breyer
observing that “it is past time to confront the difﬁcult question” of how long a detention
grounded in the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks can be justiﬁed.3
29

Iran to Restore Arak Reactor to Original Design from July 7, MEHR NEWS AGENCY (July 3, 2019), at https://en.
mehrnews.com/news/147161/Iran-to-restore-Arak-reactor-to-original-design-from-July-7. In response, the
United States called for a special session of the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. Mission to Int’l
Orgs. in Vienna Media Note, United States Requests Special Meeting of IAEA Board of Governors (July 5,
2019), at https://vienna.usmission.gov/media-note-united-states-requests-special-meeting-of-iaea-board-of-gov
ernors [https://perma.cc/5CR4-UM8R]; see also U.S. Mission to Int’l Orgs. in Vienna Media Note, Statement
by the U.S. Mission Spokesperson on the Special IAEA Board of Governors Meeting Agenda Item 1 (July 10,
2019), at https://vienna.usmission.gov/media-note-statement-by-the-u-s-mission-spokesperson-on-special-iaeaboard-of-governors-meeting-on-iran [https://perma.cc/67AX-GP73] (stating that during this special session
“Board Members expressed their concern that Iran is expanding its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities”).
30
Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran Says It Will Further Breach Nuclear Deal in One Month Unless Europeans Act,
REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2019), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran/iran-says-it-will-further-breachnuclear-deal-in-one-month-unless-europeans-act-idUSKCN1UV1TV.
31
Zack Budryk, Pompeo Doubles Down on Blaming Iran for Oil Attacks: “This Was a State-on-State Act of War,”
THE HILL (Sept. 22, 2019), at https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/462488-pompeo-doublesdown-on-blaming-iran-for-oil-attack-this-was-a (noting additional sanctions and deployments ordered by the
Trump administration in the wake of this incident and describing Pompeo as saying that “he and President
Trump are ‘looking for a diplomatic resolution’ but ‘we’re prepared to do the things we need to do’”).
1
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S. Ct. 1893 (2019).
2
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 236 F. Supp. 3d 417, 418 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 901 F.3d 294, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1893 (2019).
3
139 S. Ct., supra note 2, at 1894 (Breyer, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
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A citizen of Yemen, Al-Alwi was around twenty-ﬁve years old when he was captured in
Pakistan in late 2001.4 Among other things, he was accused of participating in Taliban
military training, supporting Taliban forces on the battleﬁeld, and continuing to support
the Taliban after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.5 He was detained pursuant to
the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by Congress shortly after the attacks
(the 2001 AUMF), and he was transferred to Guantánamo Bay in 2002.6 The 2001
AUMF authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”7
In 2005, Al-Alwi ﬁled his ﬁrst petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his classiﬁcation as an enemy combatant and his detention. The federal district court did not decide
Al-Alwi’s case until 2008, after the Supreme Court had held in Boumediene v. Bush that individuals detained at Guantánamo Bay were entitled to challenge their detention through
habeas corpus petitions.8 The district court denied his petition and in 2011, the D.C.
Circuit afﬁrmed.9 In October 2015, an administrative tribunal, which was established to
ensure that each prisoner’s continued detention was justiﬁed, determined that Al-Alwi’s continued detention was necessary.10 There appear to be no plans to either try Al-Alwi before a
military commission or to transfer him to a third country; rather, his continued detention is
justiﬁed by the United States on the basis of the laws of war.11
In May 2015, Al-Alwi ﬁled his habeas corpus petition in the case at hand.12 He did not
challenge the prior determination that his initial detention was lawful, but he claimed that his
continued detention was not authorized.13 More particularly, Al-Alwi argued that the government’s authority to detain him based on the traditional laws of war had “unraveled”
because of the unconventional nature of the conﬂict, or in the alternative, that the government’s authority to detain him had expired because the original conﬂict in Afghanistan had
ended.14
Al-Alwi’s arguments drew upon language from the opinion of a plurality of Supreme Court
justices in the 2004 decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. In that case, the plurality interpreted the
2001 AUMF to authorize the detention of combatants, but it expressed some concern about

4
The Guantánamo Docket, Moath Hamza Ahmed al Alwi, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/28-moath-hamza-ahmed-al-alwi.
5
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 236 F. Supp. 3d, supra note 2, at 419 (also noting that the ﬁnding that at one point Al-Alwi
had “voluntarily surrendered his passport at a guesthouse closely associated with al Qaeda”).
6
See id. at 418.
7
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (further stating that
such uses of force are “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations, or persons”).
8
Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing how the case was held until after the
Supreme Court’s decision).
9
See generally id.; Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
11
See The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 4.
12
See Al-Alwi v. Trump, 236 F. Supp. 3d, supra note 2.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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the potential duration of the conﬂict.15 It recognized the possibility that if “the Government
does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during
that time that Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces ﬁghting against the United States, then
the position it has taken through the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention
could last for the rest of his life.”16 The plurality then observed that “we understand Congress’
grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conﬂict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.”17 Notably, the plurality added that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conﬂict are entirely unlike those of the conﬂicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”18
On February 22, 2017, the federal district court denied Al-Alwi’s petition, ﬁnding by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was lawfully detained as an enemy combatant.19
The court found that “the record establishes clearly that both Congress and the President
agree that the military is engaged in active hostilities in Afghanistan”20 and that “this case
does not present a situation in which petitioner’s detention would be inconsistent with the
‘clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active
hostilities’ or the rationale underlying that principle.”21
On August 7, 2018, the D.C. Circuit afﬁrmed the district court’s decision, upholding AlAlwi’s continued detention.22 Like the district court, the circuit court rejected Al-Alwi’s argument that changes in the circumstances of the conﬂict warranted his release.23 The court was
not persuaded by Al-Alwi’s argument that the conﬂict’s unprecedented “duration, geographic
scope, and variety of parties involved” rendered inapplicable the principle that detention may
last until the end of hostilities.24 The court observed that neither the 2001 AUMF nor a
related subsequent statute “places limits on the length of detention in an ongoing conﬂict.”25
The court observed:
Our baseline, then, is that the AUMF remains in force if hostilities between the United
States and the Taliban and al Qaeda continue. . . .
Al-Alwi’s cited authorities merely suggest the possibility that the duration of a
conﬂict may affect the Government’s detention authority and, in any event, are not
15
542 U.S. 507, 520–21 (2004) (plurality opinion) (considering the extent to which the 2001 AUMF authorized the detention of a U.S. citizen considered by the government to be an unlawful combatant).
16
Id. at 520.
17
Id. at 521.
18
Id.
19
See Al-Alwi v. Trump, 236 F. Supp. 3d, supra note 2.
20
Id. at 421.
21
Id. at 423 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S., supra note 15, at 520–21).
22
See Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d, supra note 10, at 295.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 297.
25
Id. The court was referring not only to the 2001 AUMF, but also to the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012. Id. That act “afﬁrms” the president’s power to detain covered combatants “under the law of
war without trial until the end of hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.” National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
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controlling. . . . These statements, then, do not provide a “foundation” for Al-Alwi’s theory
to prevail or persuade. . . .
Moreover, Al-Alwi has not identiﬁed any international law principle afﬁrmatively stating
that detention of enemy combatants may not continue until the end of active hostilities,
even in a long war. Instead, law-of-war principles are open-ended and unqualiﬁed on the
subject. . . . Nor has Al-Alwi advanced an alternative detention rule that should apply at this
point. . . .
Therefore, we reject Al-Alwi’s argument that the United States’ authority to detain him has
“unraveled.”26
The D.C. Circuit also rejected Al-Alwi’s argument that, although the U.S. military is still
operating in Afghanistan, the current conﬂict is not the same as the one in which he was captured.27 Al-Alwi pointed to the transition from Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation
Freedom Sentinel in 2014, as well as the reduction of the U.S. role in Afghanistan.28 To the
court, however, “[n]othing in the text of the [2001] AUMF . . . suggests that a change in the
form of hostilities, if hostilities between the relevant entities are ongoing, cuts off [2001] AUMF
authorization.”29 Moreover, the court noted that the “Executive Branch represents that armed
hostilities between the United States forces and these entities persist,” and it concluded that the
political branches have the primary authority to determine when hostilities have ended.30
Al-Alwi then sought review from the Supreme Court, arguing that the D.C. Circuit did not
sufﬁciently consider whether the unprecedented nature of the conﬂict had altered the government’s detention authority.31 His petition observed that, if the hostilities are viewed as a single conﬂict, it has lasted for seventeen years, making it the longest declared conﬂict in
American history and longer than many conﬂicts under which the law of war developed.32
26
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d, supra note 10, at 297–98. The court did not discuss international human rights
law. But see, e.g., Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations on the Second Periodic Report
of the United States of America, at para. 22, 36th Sess. May 1–19, 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/ CO/2 (2006)
(“[D]etaining persons indeﬁnitely without charge constitutes per se a violation of the Convention [against
Torture.]”); UN Rights Chief Speaks Out Against US Failure to Close Guantánamo Detention Facility, UN NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2012), at https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/01/400992-un-rights-chief-speaks-out-against-us-failureclose-guantanamo-detention#.VQ2WoN75j8E [https://perma.cc/N8SR-UQFN] (condemning indeﬁnite detention at Guantánamo Bay as a violation of international law).
27
See Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d, supra note 10, at 299. Whether or not it should be characterized as the same
conﬂict for purposes of the 2001 AUMF, the U.S. conﬂict in Afghanistan has changed its character considerably
since 2001. See, e.g., KENNETH KATZMAN & CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30588, AFGHANISTAN:
POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY, at 17–22 (2017) (stating that “the enemy” in
Afghanistan includes the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, which has only been active in Afghanistan since
2014 and noting that the various enemy groups are not always allied with each other); 159 CONG. REC.
H5002-01 (daily ed. July 24, 2013) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (stating that the AUMF is being “used to go
after groups like al Shabaab, which may not even have been in existence at the time of 9/11”); U.S. Dep’t of
Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, at 17 (2019) (listing nine enemy groups that the
U.S. is currently ﬁghting in Afghanistan).
28
See Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d, supra note 10, at 300.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 299 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)). For further discussion of this issue, see Recent
Case, Law of War—Guantánamo Detention Authority—D.C. Circuit Holds the Government’s Authority Has Not
Unraveled—Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1542, 1546–47 (2019).
31
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S. Ct. 1893, supra note 1.
32
Id. at 14.
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Aside from the unprecedented length of the conﬂict, the ﬁghting has expanded beyond
Afghanistan and beyond the Taliban and Al Qaeda, as enemies have “regrouped and dissolved” since the conﬂict began and the 2001 AUMF was passed, making the conﬂict
more indeterminate than previous wars.33 Al-Alwi argued that the Supreme Court’s guidance
in Hamdi called upon the Court to evaluate whether these circumstances warrant judicially
enforceable limits on the duration of military detention:
If the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Hamdi stands, no set of practical circumstances
differentiating the Afghan conﬂict from its predecessors could impact the government’s
authority to imprison Mr. al-Alwi. For Hamdi to have any meaning, the plurality must
have envisioned that changes in the conﬂict’s practical circumstances other than a formal
declaration of surrender could affect the judicial understanding of detention authority.
And if the differences in duration and other circumstances setting apart this conﬂict from
its predecessors are not sufﬁcient, it is hard to imagine what differences would be.34
Al-Alwi also argued that the Supreme Court should determine whether the judiciary has the
authority to make an independent determination that a particular conﬂict has ended since
“[i]f the judiciary yields to executive declarations in the face of contrary facts, then habeas
is no check at all.”35
On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Al-Alwi’s petition for a writ of certiorari.36
Justice Breyer issued a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, arguing that the time to
reevaluate the government’s detention authority has arrived:
In my judgment, it is past time to confront the difﬁcult question left open by Hamdi. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–798, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008)
(“Because our Nation’s past military conﬂicts have been of limited duration, it has been
possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undeﬁned. If, as some fear, terrorism
continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this
luxury.”).
Some 17 years have elapsed since petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed al-Alwi, a Yemeni
national, was ﬁrst held at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In
the decision below, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Government that it
may continue to detain him so long as “armed hostilities between United States forces
and [the Taliban and Al Qaeda] persist.” The Government represents that such hostilities
are ongoing, but does not state that any end is in sight. As a consequence, al-Alwi faces the
real prospect that he will spend the rest of his life in detention based on his status as an
enemy combatant a generation ago, even though today’s conﬂict may differ substantially
from the one Congress anticipated when it passed the AUMF, as well as those “conﬂicts
that informed the development of the law of war.”37
33

Id. at 15.
Id. at 11–12.
35
Id. at 32.
36
Al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S. Ct. 1893, supra note 1.
37
Id. at 1894 (Breyer, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (citations omitted). Justice Breyer had previously signaled concern about the length of detention justiﬁed under the 2001 AUMF. See, e.g., Hussain
v. Obama, 572 U.S. 1079 (2014) (Breyer, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (agreeing with the
34
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Of the forty current detainees at Guantánamo Bay, twenty-three, like Al-Alwi, are currently held in law-of-war detention and not recommended for transfer.38 All have been
there for at least ten years.39 Many of the other detainees have also challenged their detention.40 In 2018, the Center for Constitutional Rights ﬁled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of eleven detainees.41 The petitioners in that case argued that their due process
rights have been violated in many ways, including by the effective cessation by President
Trump of case-by-case determinations with respect to the potential release, and they also
made arguments similar to Al-Alwi’s with respect to the duration of detention justiﬁed
under the 2001 AUMF.42 Sharqawi Al Hajj, one of the detainees who joined the lawsuit,
observed that “[t]he government says my detention is legal because of the indeﬁnite war
against terrorism. When terrorism ends, the war will end. So, never.”43 News reporting indicates that the Department of Defense is preparing plans for having the detention center at
Guantánamo operational for an additional twenty-ﬁve years.44
Trump and Congress have also taken action that could affect the future of the Guantánamo
Bay detention facility. In January 2018, Trump signed an executive order signaling his support for the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, both in terms of its continued operation
and as a place to which the United States could potentially bring new detainees.45
Additionally, recent versions of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
have contained provisions limiting the president’s authority to curtail operations at
Guantánamo Bay or to transfer detainees to the United States.46 With the House of
Representatives passing to Democratic control in 2019, it is unclear whether different provisions will be included in the NDAA for 2020, which is likely to pass Congress in the fall of
2019. The version passed by the House in July of 2019 differed from previous NDAAs with
respect to Guantánamo in several ways, among them: omitting a provision prohibiting the use
of funds for the transfer of Guantánamo detainees to the United States; including a provision
Court’s denial of certiorari on the ground that the petition at hand did not seek review of “unanswered questions”
like “whether . . . either the [2001] AUMF or the Constitution limits the duration of detention”).
38
The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 4.
39
Human Rights First, Guantánamo by the Numbers (Oct. 10, 2018), available at https://www.humanrights
ﬁrst.org/sites/default/ﬁles/gtmo-by-the-numbers.pdf.
40
See Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Order Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7–9, AlBihani v. Trump, (D.D.C. ﬁled Feb. 16, 2018) (No. 1:-4-cv-01194-UNA) (including a table with the status of
eleven current detainees’ petitions for habeas corpus).
41
Center for Constitutional Rights Press Release, Gitmo Attorneys to Court: Find Perpetual Detention
Unlawful and Order Release (July 11, 2018), at https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/gitmoattorneys-court-ﬁnd-perpetual-detention-unlawful-and-order.
42
Motion for Order Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–4, Al-Bihani v. Trump (D.D.C. ﬁled Jan. 11, 2018)
(No. 1:09-cv-00745-RCL).
43
See Center for Constitutional Rights Press Release, supra note 41.
44
Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo Bay as Nursing Home: Military Envisions Hospice Care as Terrorism Suspects
Age, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/politics/guantanamo-bay-agingterrorism-suspects-medical-care.html (quoting the detention center’s commander as remarking that “[u]nless
America’s policy changes, at some point we’ll be doing some sort of end of life care here”).
45
Protecting America Through Lawful Detention of Terrorists, Exec. Order No. 13823, 83 Fed. Reg. 4831
(Jan. 30, 2018); see also Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 326 (2018) (discussing this executive order in more depth).
46
See, e.g., John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
§§ 1032–35, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) (prohibiting, among other things, the use of funds for transferring detainees to
the United States).

2019

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

855

prohibiting the use of funds for the transfer of new detainees to Guantánamo; and adding a
provision expressing Congress’s sense that “the United States has an ongoing obligation to
provide medical care to individuals detained” at Guantánamo, “meeting appropriate standards of care.”47 The version passed by the Senate over the summer of 2019 did not include
these provisions,48 and as of mid-September 2019, the two chambers of Congress had not
agreed on a ﬁnal version. The future of these provisions—as well as of more ambitious efforts
to repeal the 2001 AUMF49—remains to be seen.

47

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §§ 1032–34, H.R. 2500, 116th Cong. (2019).
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §§ 1021–25, S. 1790, 116th Cong. (2019)
(largely reiterating provisions that had been included in earlier NDAAs).
49
In the summer of 2019, for example, the House of Representatives included such a provision in another
appropriation bill—a bill that, as of late September, was pending in the Senate. Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, Defense, State, Foreign Operations, and Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, 2020, H.R. 2740, 116th Cong. § 9025 (2019) (text as engrossed in the House on June 19, 2019); U.S.
Congress, All Actions H.R.2740 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-con
gress/house-bill/2740/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+2740%22%5D%7D&s=7&r=1
[https://perma.cc/RG6W-6WLP].
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